

MARINE CORPS
GAZETTE

This Month's Cover

PHOTOGRAPHED over Cherry Point by SSgt Philip L. Dagenais, these FH-1 *Phantoms* belong to the Marine Corps' first jet fighter squadron. Commanding the squadron is LtCol Marion E. Carl, whose previous experience in testing new type aircraft culminated in a world's speed record. For more on the Corps' role in jet testing, see Maj James A. Pounds' account on page 21.

THE MARINE CORPS GAZETTE

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
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
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Passing in Review

BOOKS OF INTEREST TO MARINE READERS

Navy Record . . .

BATTLE REPORT, The End of an Empire—Capt Walter Karig, USNR, LtCmdr Russell L. Harris, USNR, and LtCmdr Frank A. Manson, USN. 424 pages. Illustrated. New York: Rinehart & Co. $5.00

Fourth of a five volume series, *The End of an Empire* was prepared from official sources and bears the Navy Department's tacit stamp of approval. Professing to be "as factually and technically accurate . . . as the authors could devise," and already termed "indispensable source books" by at least one eminent military commentator, the series has nevertheless been disappointing from a Marine Corps point of view. The cursory treatment given landing operations is, perhaps, understandable; after all, the authors are Naval officers, writing the Navy's record. But the semi-official cast of the series plus the sources to which the authors had access would seem to remove all excuse for the numerous factual errors which even the casual Marine reader will note in Volume IV.

Here are a few errors, typical of those which annoyed this reviewer:

1. In discussing the landings on Roi-Namur, the authors say that the only change in the planned schedule of the whole Marshall campaign was a 30 minute delay of H-hour on D-day. A reply to this might be "Oh, yeah?"—at least from marines who saw H-hour delayed *one hour* on D-plus-1-day (the main landings), and who noticed numerous other deviations from the schedule after the LVT plan fell apart.

2. The caption of a photograph showing two Marine officers on Peleliu identifies one (properly) as MajGen William H. Rupertus but calls the other "Colonel Lewis Fuller, who commanded the 1st Marine Brigade." Lewie Puller and the 1st Regiment may not like this.

3. The 16th Field Depot is twice called the "first Negro unit of Marines." This unit was neither all-Negro nor was it the first unit to include Negro marines.

4. At least by inference, Marine units are reported as receiving the full force of the big banzai charge on Saipan. No mention is made of the Army regiments which actually bore the brunt and which suffered most of the casualties.

Broadly speaking, these errors of fact and omission might be considered unimportant. But they certainly are unnecessary, and they do leave the factual accuracy of the whole book open to suspicion. One assumes that formal action reports were the primary sources of material, yet it appears that the authors frequently turned to sources which, though doubtless more entertaining than official accounts, were somewhat less exact.

As to scope, this volume dips back into late 1942 for a resume of the MacArthur and Halsey clean-ups, then proceeds through the Gilbert, Marshall, Palau, and Mariana operations and the first phases of the Philippine campagn. As indicated above, the battles in the air and on the water get preferred treatment, which is probably just as well. After all, the Marines' contribution to the Pacific campaigns has been recorded elsewhere by writers better equipped to do it. HS

Writers' Aid . . .

THE ART OF PLAIN TALK—Dr Rudolph Flesch, 210 pages. New York: Harper and Brothers. $2.50

In 1944, Rudolph Flesch submitted his Ph.D. dissertation at the Teacher's College, Columbia University. It was entitled "Marks of a Readable Style." Its main feature was a formula for computing just how hard written material is to read. It was intended as an instrument for researchers, librarians, teachers, educators, and writers. Dr Flesch, finding that he had not followed his own principles of writing, undertook to apply them to his dissertation and found that he had written a new book: *The Art of Plain Talk.*

This book is not only easy to read but has even been characterized by some reviewers as "flippant." It is, nevertheless, an important contribution—one which all marines responsible for producing written material should read—particularly if the material is to be read by others.

Dr Flesch begins by demonstrating with the Chinese language just how simple a language can be when it contains no affixes (prefixes or suffixes). He dissects conversational language to show why it is plain and easy to understand. Then he begins to prepare you for his simple formula. He demonstrates the value of short sentences, the case against affixes, and the importance of personal references.

The most important part of the book is the formula.



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It was derived by statistical method and works like this: you compute the average sentence length of a sample of written material and multiply it by .1338. You compute the number of affixes per hundred words and multiply that figure by .0645. You add the two figures together. Then you multiply the number of personal references per hundred words by .0659 and subtract the result from the sum of the first two figures. From that result is subtracted a constant (.75) to get the readability score. Dr Flesch includes a scale in the book so that scores can be interpreted. It runs from 1 and under (very easy) to 6 and over (very difficult).

After you get the yardstick, as he calls the formula, he tells you about "live words," "empty words," "crowded words," and many of the practical rules of plain talk.

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For at least the first three years after Dr Flesch perfected his formula, its greatest use was in the advertising field. Various psychologists and other groups have put the formula to a new use. In 1947, they used it to gauge the readability of employees' manuals prepared by manufacturing concerns. These manuals were found far too difficult for average consumption. By the application of Flesch's rules, they were toned down from "hard" to "easy" reading level.

This is an indication of the book's importance to marines. Many of our publications—letters of instruction, field manuals, etc.—must be read and understood by a wide variety of people. Their readability should be relatively easy.

The book is highly recommended to all those who would like to turn out clear and lucid written products.

GSB

Four Navy Leaders . . .

ADMIRALS OF AMERICAN EMPIRE—Richard S. West, Jr., 354 pages, illustrated. Indianapolis and New York: The Bobbs-Merrill Company. $4.00.

This is more than the story of four naval officers. It is the story of an era of American history, the importance of which is all too little appreciated by many present day writers. That period, encompassing the later years of the 19th century and the beginning of the 20th, marked the emergence of this nation as a first rate world power. *Admirals of the American Empire* is the comparative biography of the four officers, who more than any others in uniform, were responsible for ushering this nation into its place among the leading world powers.

The four individuals so aptly titled "Admirals of American Empire" are George Dewey, Alfred Mahan, Winfield Schley, and William Sampson. As the book so carefully relates, each of these makers of American Empire, though

possessing contrasting personalities, had much in common —a belief in the destiny of this nation, and the conviction that naval power was the key to the realization of that destiny.

Fortunately, Prof West has the rare ability of being able to reduce a complicated history—as this combined biography basically is—into well reasoned and readable increments. This book begins with an introductory chapter covering the naval academy careers of the four cadets. Even at this early stage of their professional lives, the dominant features of their characters become evident—the aggressive independence of Dewey, the carefree originality of Schley, the brilliant scholastic record of Sampson, and the intellectual strength and personal loneliness of Mahan.

After carrying the four future Admirals, Dewey, Mahan, Schley, and Sampson through the Naval Academy (they graduate in that order in four successive years) the author then adheres to a simple but effective pattern for the remainder of the book. There are five parts, each consisting of four separate biographical accounts of the four officers. In this manner the reader is able to compare the events in their lives during comparable periods.

The author traces, with an easy narrative style, and a keen eye on the contemporary events of those times, the professional growth of the four officers: Dewey, Sampson, and Schley readying themselves for high command afloat; Mahan, showing less and less inclination toward sea duty, continued to devote himself to the theoretical, but also very fundamental aspects of naval power.

As the war clouds began to darken the skies from the Caribbean to Manila, the book's principal figures moved more rapidly toward the role they were destined to play in the war against Spain. Schley had already become a national hero by commanding the Greely relief expedition to the Arctic. Sampson had, upon going to sea in November of 1889, completed three years as Superintendent of the Naval Academy. Dewey before going to command the Asiatic Fleet served as Chief of the Bureau of Equipment in Washington. Mahan, whose epic *Influence of Sea Power on History* had been published in 1890, had achieved greater fame, by far, in Germany and England than had been accorded him in his own country. In 1896, on his own request, Mahan, still a Captain after 40 years service, retired from active duty. He was quickly recalled to active duty on the outbreak of hostilities.

The Spanish-American War provides the background against which the climactic events in the lives of Sampson, Schley, Dewey, and Mahan are projected. Wartime activities and contributions to ultimate victory by each of these officers are related in detail by the author, and are placed in their proper relationship to the events of the war. The critical reader will appreciate the numerous battle diagrams as well as actual photographs of the ships involved. In its basic pattern, the book is more than a long-needed combined biography of the Admirals who helped make this nation a great power; it is a scholarly history of the era dominated by the Spanish-American War.

But as always, those who gain victories are but instruments for effecting a policy devised by higher governmental authority. Sampson and Schley off the South Coast of Cuba, and Dewey at Manila, were executing the policy long sought by the true architect of American Empire, Theodore Roosevelt. As the aggressive Assistant Secretary of the Navy on the eve of the Spanish-American War, it was "Teddy" Roosevelt who, as the author states, "was determined, come hell or high water to put Mahan's program into effect." It was Mahan, who never went to sea in the Spanish-American War, and his pupil, Roosevelt, who steered this nation toward the realization of its "manifest destiny" as a great world power. Indeed, Mahan and Theodore Roosevelt were practicing the precepts of geopolitics long before McKinder propounded his heart-land theory, and before Haushofer warped McKinder's principles to the mold of Nazi ideology.

In spite of Prof West's unusual ability to grasp the significance of events and interpret them for his readers, there is on major omission in the book, an omission all the more regrettable because of its importance to the de-

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velopment of naval thought in this country. The author devotes only three or four lines to Sampson's seizure of the advance fleet base at Guantanamo Bay prior to the main landings off Santiago. The Guantanamo Bay landing, conducted by a battalion of U. S. Marines, serving as fleet landing forces, was an event of fundamental significance in our naval history. It demonstrated to naval commanders the inherent wisdom of incorporating marine landing forces into the structure of our fleets. As such it was the modern genesis of our present day fleet marine forces, as well as the beginning of the development of the concept of the balanced fleet, the guiding principal for the organization of U. S. fleets today. Because it marked the inception of fleet marine forces and the concept of the balanced fleet, the Guantanamo Bay operation became a point of departure of U. S. naval thought from that of England and other European maritime powers. It is regrettable that the author did not give the Guantanamo Bay operation the important treatment it so well deserves and which would have been so appropriate to this book.

JDH

Maritime History . . .

THE SEA AND THE STATES—Samuel W. Bryant. 564 pages, illustrated. New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Company. $5.00

The Sea and the States is aptly described by its subtitle—"A Maritime History of the American People." It is the first of several volumes to be offered by the publisher in "The Growth of America Series." The author, Samuel W. Bryant, was educated in the United States and abroad, graduating from Amherst in 1930, and is now with Time, Inc.

It was the maritime rivalry of England and Spain which led to the defeat of the Armada and thus decided the destiny of the American people. How the influence of the sea continued to mold that destiny is interestingly told in a fact-filled account of explorers, traders, fishermen and slavers; packets and clipper ships; privateers and men-of-war.

Integrated in the panorama as it unfolds is the story of the Navy. The reader cannot avoid being struck by the monotonous regularity of the pattern — unpreparedness due to public apathy when war breaks out, a heroic renaissance to play its part in the attainment of victory, and then another peacetime struggle for existence. The author has several complimentary things to say about the Marine Corps, particularly its actions in World Wars I and II.

This book is broad in its scope and obviously is the result of painstaking reseach. On the whole it is well written, although occasional flights to the recondite or the facetious, the latter especially in evaluation of contemporary figures, indicate a certain literary immaturity.

RCB

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The Marine Corps Gazette

THE PROFESSIONAL MAGAZINE FOR UNITED STATES MARINES

JUNE 1948

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NEW RIVER LANDING—1862 ..... IV COVER

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This Month and Next

COL MANLY L. CURRY'S *Background for Palestine* in this issue marks the institution of a new series of articles on area intelligence. These articles, which are being prepared by a number of well-qualified experts, will give our readers some of the reasons why behind present day military headlines.


Next month we print the final chapter in Fletcher Pratt's *Marines in the Pacific War*. This series has been running just short of two years, but like all good things it must eventually come to an end. Mr Pratt, however, has promised us more of his highly readable copy in the very near future.

If this jet propulsion business has your head in a whirl, *Evolution of Speed* by William P. Brotherton will get you oriented. Mr Brotherton has been explaining technical subjects in layman's language for some years. At present he is employed by Ryan Aeronautical Company.

Base Plate McGurk explains the why and wherefor of *Esprit de Corps*. LtCol Robert E. Cushman tears the present award system apart in *Battle Decorations*. Maj Alan R. Cason emphasizes a basic truth in a bit of whimsy *The Hills, The Woods, and John Rifleman*.

Hanson W. Baldwin in his *How Strong is Russia?* G-2's the Soviet's military strength and potential. Mr Baldwin, the *New York Times'* military editor, is perhaps America's best-informed military writer. 2dLt William A. Reavis, who stirred up something with his *Why Not a Marine Corps Academy?*, doesn't think much of present Marine Corps close order drill. He says our proficiency is low and our regulations confusing in his *Why Not a Marine Corps Drill Manual?*

Naval Gunfire Training in the Pacific



AS OF THE BEGINNING OF 1945, HEADQUARTERS FLEET Marine Force Pacific, located at Pearl Harbor under Gen Holland M. Smith, found itself in possession of a rather extraordinary special staff section[1] (Naval Gunfire) which in something less than a year had become a keystone in Pacific Fleet Gunnery training; had taken possession of one of the Hawaiian islands, where it maintained what amounted to a separate Marine Detachment; had in operation a virtual replacement training center for assault signal companies in the Fleet Marine Force; was participating in the gunfire support spotting of carrier pilots, as well as float-plane pilot replacements of the Pacific Fleet; and was shortly to initiate a large-scale program of Army-Marine field-officer training in amphibious gunnery. The enlisted personnel of this unconventional staff section included cooks, pharmacist's mates, and 81mm mortar crews, in addition to the more usual complement of clerks and draftsmen, and the officers—in a Marine headquarters—were more than 90 per cent from other branches of the service.

Since the Naval gunfire staff function is itself peculiar to Marine staffs, and since, in light of accepted military staff functions and procedure, the role and development of this section transcended any previous limits, the history of the Naval Gunfire Section, FMFPac, is well worthy of

[1]The naval gunfire section exists on all Marine staffs from brigade to Fleet Marine Force. A purely amphibious staff function, its duties are to plan, coordinate, and supervise the employment of ships' gunfire within the landing force. Incident to this major responsibility, the naval gunfire section overseas training of all shore fire control personnel prior to operations, and represents the landing force commander in dealings with the naval attack force gunnery section prior to and throughout operations.

Modern naval gunfire is the result of Marine Corps visualization between wars. The basic concept of ships' gunfire is that it must be the artillery of the landing force and the amphibious attacker's means of overbalancing the defense

By LtCol Robert D. Heinl, Jr.

review as an important element in the final formula of Pacific victory.

It should be emphasized, at the outset, that the evolution of modern naval gunfire support from its nadir at the Dardanelles in 1916 to its final crescendos at Iwo Jima and Okinawa in 1945 was to a great extent the product of U. S. Marine Corps visualization, long prior to World War II, of the nature of present-day amphibious warfare. Just as the scholars at Marine Corps Schools foresaw, as early as 1922, the problems of reef-crossing, of amphibious logistics and the shore party, of joint command, and of close air support, so also they realized that, without effective naval gunfire support, amphibious assault would be impossible. Trained artillerymen ashore as they were experienced gunnery officers afloat, certain of the Marine amphibious thinkers addressed themselves to the task of harnessing naval gunfire for effective use against shore targets, and the results of their efforts, primitively tested in the Fleet Landing Exercises of the 1930s, became the basic doctrine of the U. S. Navy as expressed in FTP-167, the Navy landing operations manual which, even prior to 1938, had been prepared by the staff of Marine Corps Schools.

The gunfire support techniques of those days were rudimentary, as indeed the expectations of what might be accomplished were cautious, but the basic concepts that ships' gunfire must be the artillery of the landing force and that naval firepower must be the amphibious attacker's means of overbalancing the defense—these concepts were firmly established from the outset, and remained basic in Marine thinking throughout World War II.

As of 1941—when the orthodox military mind was awakening somewhat tardily to amphibious warfare—the Headquarters of Amphibious Corps, Atlantic Fleet (commanded by MajGen Holland Smith), already embodied a Naval gunfire officer (Maj (now Col) Donald M. Weller, one of the specialty's earliest pioneers) who in turn was training individual ships' shore fire control personnel[3] in the Atlantic Fleet, and who was peddling, virtually from door to door, the idea that in order to raise ships to the proper proficiency, it was absolutely necessary to have some kind of island impact-area where amphibious gunnery could be practiced.

After being on the receiving end of a good deal of such missionary work during 1941 and early 1942, CinCLant consented to the procurement of Bloodsworth Island, in the Chesapeake off the Eastern Shore of Maryland for use as a Naval gunfire range. So far as is known, Bloodsworth Island thus became the first amphibious gunnery range ever to be established solely for that purpose, although, to be sure, San Clemente and Culebra-Vieques, traditional U. S. amphibious maneuver-areas, had already received their share of naval ammunition incident to landing exercises. Bloodsworth Island differed in its employment, however, from Clemente and Culebra. The new range was not to be the site of joint training or of the more advanced tactical training. Its primary mission was to train warships and their gunners in the necessarily complex and new techniques of hitting shore targets; Bloodsworth Island was to Culebra, then, what the rifle range is to the maneuver-area or the combat-range.

Foreshadowing the later role of FMFPac in the same field, Gen Smith's naval gunfire officer was called upon to devise the actual firing-exercises and practices to be used at Bloodsworth, and, in conjunction with enthusiastic Navy gunnery officers, this was accomplished in time so that fire-support ships and air-spotters of the Fleet could obtain their initial training prior to the North African landings.[4]

At this juncture, however, the high command's 1942 decision to concentrate the Fleet Marine Force for the war against Japan removed the Marine naval gunfire pioneers from the Atlantic to the Pacific, where they were soon to play a major role.

Throughout 1942 and early 1943, the two Pacific Fleet agencies concerned with amphibious gunnery were the Amphibious Force and Amphibious Corps. Between the two—and again at the insistent sparking of Marine naval gunfire officers—training both for ships and for naval gunfire liaison officers was carried on. The Amphibious Corps, Pacific Fleet, however, was destined shortly to be redesignated as the V Amphibious Corps, Fleet Marine Force, and to assume command over the Marine units

[3]The shore fire control party of those days was provided by the firing ship, and was composed of officers of the gunnery department and radio operators.

[4]All the Army's assault infantry divisions in this operation—namely, the 1st, 3d, and 9th Infantry Divisions—received their amphibious training from the Fleet Marine Force, and were the first such Army units ever to receive amphibious training.

which spearheaded the Central Pacific drive. In line with this change, V Amphibious Corps headquarters was established in the Hawaiian area, and, just as had been the case with all previous major FMF headquarters, it immediately interested itself in local possibilities for Naval gunfire training, both of ships and troops.

On 7 September 1943, therefore, after both the local and the general situation with respect to amphibious gunnery had been thoroughly canvassed, CinCPac directed staff representatives of the V Amphibious Corps to select, establish and operate—in conjunction with ComCruDesPac—who had extensive Fleet training responsibilities in the Hawaiian area—an island naval gunfire range to be employed in similar fashion to its Atlantic protoype, Bloodsworth Island.

FIRST CHOICES in the Hawaiian Islands were isolated areas of Molokai or Hawaii, but these were prudently eliminated after certain officers had expressed doubts as to the safety of shooting naval gunfire at *any* inhabitated island not under the Japanese flag. Kahoolawe, however, an arid, volcano-twisted island just south of Maui and east of Lanai, was thought to offer possibilities, and, on 27 September, Maj Joseph L. Stewart, of the V Amphibious Corps staff, was rowed ashore in a wherry at Smugglers' Cove, Kahoolawe. Less than a month later, all arrangements had been completed, the Kahoolawe bombardment exercises had been established, and the first of many hundred briefing conferences had been held jointly by gunnery representatives of ComCruDesPac and FMF shore fire control officers with gunnery and communication representatives of the firing ship. On the afternoon of 20 October, the Marine shore fire control party boarded USCG *Tiger* for a rough trip down to Kahoolawe from Pearl, and at 0700 next day, the Marines landed and set up their radio equipment in the open air on a hilltop overlooking Smuggler's Cove, thus demonstrating, without so much as a foxhole, their confidence in the new arm.

At 0818, 21 October (18 minutes late, as one Kahoolawe veteran tartly observed in retrospect), the USS *Pennsylvania* fired the opening salvo, thus christening the range and saluting the début of Marines in Hawaiian shore fire control training. By the end of October, five more ships had fired—in preparation for fire-support duties in the Gilberts—and Kahoolawe's throbbing tempo of wartime activity had commenced in dead earnest.


The final—and most necessary—preliminary for the full-fledged emergence of Headquarters, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific, into the naval gunfire training field at this time was simply that FMFPac must be created as such. Happily, this took place in effect on 10 April 1944 when Adm Nimitz realized the necessity of a Pacific Fleet type-command to oversee Fleet Marine activities, and divorced the now wholly-combatant V Amphibious Corps headquarters from the considerable administrative and training load which it was likewise attempting to carry; in its stead there were created first a provisional command to accomplish these missions, and finally, Headquarters, FMFPac. Throughout the rapid sequence of these administrative changes, the Naval Gunfire Section, now busy at Kahoolawe as well as with manifold responsibilities in planning and evolution of doctrine, worked steadily away.

Throughout the summer of 1944, in spite of a steadily increasing tempo of exercises, as the full value of Naval Gunfire support came to be appreciated, the Section did little more than continue to operate on an open-air basis, with no observation posts and no equipment beyond field radios. As had been past practice in the V Amphibious Corps, a small pool of experienced naval gunfire liaison officers was maintained by FMFPac for allocation to the troop staffs of corps, divisions, and regiments (the original tables of organization for the JASCO[5] provided no NGLOs except for battalions, and this, as well as other glaring defects of organization, had to be provisionally remedied by such measures).

AT SOME TIME in the early summer of 1944, after experience had clearly demonstrated the hazard of attempting to instruct inexperienced warships in the new art, several heavily-timbered observation posts, together with minor camp facilities for life ashore, were erected near Smuggler's Cove on Kahoolawe. With this construction there arose the necessity of modifying the shore fire control party into something more like an outpost detachment, with housekeeping personnel, and from that time on, operations of the FMFPac shore bombardment teams came more and more to resemble those of a fully commissioned unit. Concurrently, the composition and internal organization of the Naval Gunfire Section began the sequence of changes and convulsive expansions which from an administrative standpoint seemed so bizarre to those not aware of the scope or critical nature of the Section's mushrooming activities.

After the campaign in mid-1944, the necessity of providing a larger flow of qualified replacement shore fire control personnel for the still-novel JASCOs became apparent. Not only were stateside shore fire control party replacements, Marine and Navy, officer and enlisted, all alike proving to be ill-prepared for field-duty in the new

[5]The JASCO, so-called, was the original Joint Assault Signal Company, an organization of Marine or Army communication teams, as well as the requisite Navy personnel, for naval gunfire, air support, and shore-beach party communications. After Marine experience had demonstrated several flaws in the original organization, it was redesignated as an Assault Signal Company—another instance of Marine leadership in the amphibious field, for the Marine changes were adopted almost to the letter in similar Army units, but almost a year later, after hostilities had ceased. See *Minority Report on (J)ASCO, Gazette,* July 1947.



A fuel dump, left center, and the Charon-Kanoa sugar refinery, right, send up dense columns of smoke hundreds of feet in the air after bombardment by ships and aircraft of the Pacific Fleet.

specialty, but, for the first time, heavy casualties had taken toll of the few experienced personnel. As a result, and to meet criticism from the field that Naval gunfire officers (particularly the Navy liaison officers) were not properly trained for combat duty with troops, it was decided to funnel all replacement shore fire control personnel through short indoctrination courses under supervision of the Naval Gunfire Section at FMFPac headquarters. At the same time, commencing with the 3d JASCO, and followed shortly by the 2d and 5th, it was determined to try the experiment of recalling to Pearl after each operation the naval gunfire elements of each JASCO for refresher training and integration of replacements. Advantages of this scheme were several in number and deserve attention:

(1) Since naval gunfire support was at this time still developing quite rapidly, battle-lessons and latest changes in technique could be imparted on the spot to all hands, both newcomers and veterans.

(2) Replacements could be carefully selected for "hand-tailored" integration into the repective teams.

(3) Fleet training activities centered in the Hawaiian area—such as the Kahoolawe range, and the Pacific Fleet Gunnery and Torpedo School[7]—could be freely used to improve the knowledge and skill of shore fire control personnel, with the result that the thousands of rounds of naval ammunition being expended monthly for ships' training could concurrently be used at Kahoolawe by the very Marine elements which would control the fire of those ships in combat.

(4) Return to the Hawaiian area after combat afforded excellent rehabilitation, and materially boosted the morale of personnel concerned, some of whom, in the burgeoning days of gunfire support, had found themselves serving in a "lost sheep" status with units improperly indoctrinated in the full employment of gunfire support or the correct use of naval gunfire liaison personnel.

As a result of the foregoing advantages of centralized training, and because careful survey and examination of replacements at FMFPac had conclusively established that NGF replacement-training in the United States was defective both in scope and quality, it became necessary to augment the FMFPac NGF Section by a small instructor group, composed of experienced naval gunfire liaison officers who would normally have been eligible for rotation. To these Navy officers, some of whom had been controlling naval gunfire since Tarawa, fell not only the duty of much training, but also the revision, under supervision of the Force Naval Gunfire Officer, of the Amphibious Corps standing operating procedures for troop employment of naval gunfire support, which, in expanded form became FMFPac Standing Operating Procedure NGF-1, the outstanding, and until 1946, the only complete manual on the subject, in this or any other language or country.

Concurrently with this intensification of training, even closer liaison was established with Pacific Fleet training activities in the Hawaiian area. As a result, student-quotas for FMF officers were allocated from Gunnery Officers' Course at the Fleet Gunnery and Torpedo School, and soon after, a special two-week course was especially established by that school for the indoctrination in naval

[7]Another war-born institution of much importance in the Pacific gunnery field, this school, operating under the tireless Comdr E. K. Van Swearingen, from Camp Catlin, Oahu, served to standardize and improve the caliber of Pacific Fleet gunnery by its practical and hard-working methods. From the outset, this school and the FMFPac Naval Gunfire Section enjoyed very close relations with regard to the technical evolution of shore bombardment techniques.

gunnery of Marine NGF spotters. In the resulting arrangements, a permanent FMFPac liaison officer was retained by the Naval Gunfire Section as a member of the staff of that school, so that all aspects of shore bombardment and troop support could be effectively presented to the hundreds of Navy gunnery officers who passed through the courses. Following the same lines, which were proving so fruitful at the Gunnery School, similar relations were established with the Pacific Fleet Combat Information (CIC) School, so that FMF naval gunfire personnel could also receive authoritative indoctrination in this specialty which bore so closely upon effective fire-support.

As a result of lessons learned in battles by ships and shore fire control parties, a progressive modification of gunnery standards and of the exercises themselves was undertaken by ComCruDesPac, assisted by FMFPac. Thus, the firing of shore bombardment practices had become one of the most realistic, not to say difficult gunnery hurdles which confronted ships. That all this tightening of standards and lengthening of exercises was fully justified had already begun to be apparent toward the end of 1944 after the Marianas and Peleliu, but full realization of the progress achieved would await conclusion of the Iwo Jima battle in 1945.

Yet another offshoot of the Fleet Marine Force's expanding bombardment training program was the institution of a type of "dry-run" shore bombardment drill whereby combat ships entering and leaving Pearl Harbor, while still in radio range of Camp Catlin on Oahu, where most gunfire training facilities were centralized, would be scheduled to establish full radio communications with shore fire control parties ashore, who would then require ships to simulate bombardment of assigned targets along the south coast of Oahu. These drills, which were carefully scheduled and graded prior to the ships' actual firing runs at Kahoolawe, were of great value in standardizing procedures and improving ships' performances both on the range and in combat. From the troop point of view, in turn, they afforded the best sort of practical training for replacements, and regrouping of joint assault signal companies.

One of the lessons of the Marianas campaign, among others related to gunfire-support, had been that ships' float-plane spotters were not properly trained to conduct fire against terrain targets. This defect in fact had been provisionally remedied by the field forces in some instances by substituting Marine spotters or air observers for the Navy rear-cockpit observers. As a means of repairing this defect, however, the FMFPac Naval Gunfire Section proposed that Scout-Observation Service Unit One (SOSU-1), the Pacific Fleet activity responsible for VO-VS training, undertake standardized air-spotting training for all pilots and observers, using the Kahoolawe range. This suggestion was adopted during the Autumn of 1944, and one Navy officer from the FMF NGF Section was charged, in conjunction with the staff of SOSU-1, with the training of ships' air-spotters and Navy pilots.

This development happily coincided with arrival in the Pacific theatre of a Navy aviation squadron unique in mission: VOF-1, a carrier-type fighter squadron the pilots of which had been specially trained at Fort Sill for naval gunfire and artillery spotting in the European theater. The initial formation of this unit had been prompted by its high survival-value against fighters and flak, and by the fact that its existence would afford the earliest possible provision of spotting aircraft during an amphibious operation. This promise was realized in Europe, and arrival of the squadron at Pearl for Pacific indoctrination and naval gunfire checkout during the months prior to Iwo Jima afforded the Naval Gunfire Section a further opportunity to conduct air-spotting training. This was done by the medium of a number of practices specially arranged at Kahoolawe for VOF-1, and from the success of these, further training of three succeeding squadrons of the same type became a function of the FMFPac Naval Gunfire Section.

As a final preparation for the Iwo Jima operation, which was rightly considered to present a most rigid set of test-conditions for naval gunfire doctrines and techniques, in November and December of 1944, the complete shore fire control elements of three V Amphibious Corps divisions (3d, 4th, and 5th) were successively sent to Kahoolawe for a type of rehearsal target-practice styled a "firing CPX." These exercises involved the simulated landing of all naval gunfire teams of a Marine division in an assumed tactical situation, the establishment of full communications, and conduct (in the open) of firing problems with live ammunition from ships of an assigned fire support group. Over a 24-hour period in such an exercise, all types of fires and tactical problems were carried out, and some 2,000 rounds of 5"-38 ammunition were expended.

The beginning of 1945 found all foregoing training activities in full swing; these were to constitute, until the end of the war, the major fabric of amphibious gunnery training by the FMF Naval Gunfire Section. As personnel departed for V Amphibious Corps divisions and eventually for ordeal by battle on Iwo Jima, a similar cycle was commencing for corresponding elements of the III Amphibious Corps in preparation for the scarcely less formidable Okinawa operation. By this time, as well, the tempo of Navy training of ships and aircraft had hit its final peak, which was to be maintained without interruption until September, 1945. From 40 to 60 combatant ships per month were being qualified at

Kahoolawe, while JASCO replacement-students of all naval gunfire SSNs, officer and enlisted, Marine and Navy, were now counted in hundreds.

During the Spring and Summer of 1945, as the results of Iwo Jima and Okinawa could be appraised, it became apparent how well the operational procedures and doctrines stood their tests in combat, as it was plain that the wide and intensive training had proven of indisputable value and soundness in conception.

As Adm Turner had occasion to state in his action report after Okinawa:

> "Every effort was made to allow all ships in the Hawaiian Area an opportunity to fire the qualification test in shore bombardment at Kahoolawe, T.H., conducted by FMFPac in collaboration with ComCruPac and ComDesPac. It is believed that this is the first operation in which every participating fire-support ship had, at some time in the past, fired the course, and the benefits gained therefrom were evident in the manner to which the ships shifted from one assignment to another and carried out missions with a minimum of confusion and delay and with maximum efficiency and with increased understanding between ship and shore."

At this time, as well, large-scale preparations for Naval gunfire support in the great projected battles of Japan were undertaken. In addition to the now routine training measures for Fleet Marine Force Troops which FMFPac was conducting, CincPac directives now required that the Fleet Marine Force undertake similar replacement-training for Navy officers awaiting assignment in the Army joint assault signal companies under CincPac control. This expansion, together with a unit program for the 294th JASCO, assigned to the 98th Army Division, was put into effect in May of 1945.

SHORTLY previous, after abruptly realizing at this length the importance of naval fires in amphibious operations, the Army had requested that CincPac provide training for some 150 senior Army officers as prospective naval gunfire staff officers in the Pacific forces being redeployed for the showdown with Japan. This request was in turn passed by CincPac to Fleet Marine Force where the Naval Gunfire Section immediately set to drawing up and organizing a field officers' course of six weeks' duration, designated to provide such officers with an introduction to the necessary background to act as division, corps and field-army naval gunfire officers. At this same time, it was prudently decided to include quotas of Marine officers in each succeeding class, which was to total 15 students.

On 18 June 1945, the first class convened, and prior to the termination of hostilities, a second had virtually completed its course.

By 1 September 1945, when the postwar suspension of large-scale training had taken effect, a total of 532 major combatant ships, or an average of more than 25 per month since October 1943, had been trained at Kahoolawe by the Naval Gunfire Section; during the same period, more than 600 joint shore-bombardment communication drills between shore fire control parties, ships and spotting aircraft had been likewise conducted; some 350 Navy, Marine and Army shore fire control officers had graduated from replacement or refresher-training programs; over 150 Navy pilots had received naval gunfire air spotting instruction on the ground and in the air; and 730 Marine enlisted ASCO replacements had been put through training. Commencing after the Marianas campaign, all assault signal companies of the Fleet Marine Force had received post-operational refresher training, rehabilitation and regrouping in the Hawaiian area under the Naval Gunfire Section.

IN ADDITION to all the foregoing activities (which had in June, 1945, resulted in its redesignation as the Naval Gunfire *Training* Section, FMFPac, in lieu of the former title) the section's offices in Pearl had served as a joint planning center for virtually all major amphibious gunnery planning on corps or higher levels for every operation in which FMF troops participated. In its planning sanctum there had been evolved such notable advances in technique as the Iwo Jima rolling-barrages; the target-analysis studies which made preliminary naval bombardment a science, the evolution of the final shore fire control section as embodied in the Marine ASCO; and as well as countless other detailed improvements and refinements. A continual flow of informational publications, compilations of data, bulletins and doctrines had likewise been issued.

As a result of the unceasing drive and imagination of the Marine and Navy officers who staffed the Naval Gunfire Section, Fleet Marine Force, that redoubtable force of Marines had learned to realize the most from ships' fire-support. In graphic demonstration of this it might be pointed out that some 129,000 *tons* of naval gunfire had been fired on shore targets in close support of FMF operations during the war. What the Section's long-term effect on naval gunnery, both in terms of doctrine and training, had been, it would be hard to define. Certainly by its effective coordination of joint training and its prosecution of joint operations, it had demonstrated, not for the first time, the aptness of the Marines in such matters. Through the energy and keen interest with which it had been directed, it had, by the war's end, become indisputably the central agency in the Pacific, if not the world, from which landing force naval gunfire doctrines germinated.

This Fleet Marine Force staff section, then, had taken an untried, an unprecedented military specialty, and brought it to a position of indispensability in amphibious operations. US MC

The Near Future of the LVT

By Maj Victor J. Croizat

IT IS REASONABLE TO ASSUME THAT, IN THE EVENT combat landings are executed by the Marine Corps within the next few years, the equipment employed will be to a large extent that which is now held in storage. The LVTs of the immediate future will, therefore, be the present LVT(3)s and the LVT (A)(5)s. Although it is admitted that research and development of new types of amphibious vehicles is underway, the fruits of this research will not reach the using arm for several years.

Present Marine Corps amphibian tractor units are equipped with both the LVT(3) and the LVT(A)(5). The only interchangeable part between these two type machines is the bogie wheel. It is immediately obvious that such an arrangement requires the procurement and distribution of two types of spare parts. In addition the vehicles differ in the method of operation and in maintenance procedure. The training requirements for personnel therefore is doubled. In times when a shortage of personnel exists and particularly when qualified mechanics are rarities, the maintenance of an amphibian tractor unit at a high peak of efficiency is virtually impossible.

The LVT(A)(5) is an improvised vehicle designed to utilize mechanical components available in quantity during the war. The hull design is the old LVT(A)(2), now obsolete. The 75mm howitzer gyro stabilized power traversed turret was added to the LVT (A)(2) to produce the present LVT (A)(5). In order to stand the additional weight it was also necessary to modify the final drive gear ratios.

It is already admitted that both the LVT (3) and the LVT (A)(5) have numerous defects. However the LVT(3), after its battle test at Okinawa, was adopted as the standard cargo LVT for the Marine Corps. Reports on the LVT(3) were generally favorable and indicated the superiority of this machine over the other cargo types of LVTs. Since the LVT (A) (5) is an improvised LVT (A)(2) it follows that an improvised LVT(3) can perform the role of the LVT(A)(5). By removing the armament from the LVT(A)(5) and adding it to an LVT(3) it would be possible to increase the efficiency of LVT units by reducing the operational load on personnel. Further, an economy in supply requirements would result. Because of budget restrictions it is maintained that the modification of the LVT(3) can be performed with existing facilities and materials at a minimum expense. Such a modification would require, at first study, the lowering of the LVT(3) cab and possible change in the final drive ratios.

In the modification of an amphibious vehicle the question of weight assumes great importance. It is admitted that some form of armor is desirable both for the LVT(3) and the heavily armed type (the present LVT (A)(5). However it appears that weight limitations restrict the armor type to be that which can deflect only small arms fire and fragments. Heavier armor is of little value because to stop heavier projectiles would require more armor than the present LVT can carry. It thus follows that part of the armor of the present LVT(A)(5) is heavier than necessary. The modification of the LVT(3) to replace the LVT(A)(5) should thus include a reduction of armor weight in the turret. This reduction of weight would materially increase the mechanical efficiency of the proposed LVT(A)(3).

The weight of a weapon for LVTs is also of great importance in a vehicle which must float. The recoiless rifle at first glance appears to be an excellent weapon for the LVT. The LVT doesn't require a weapon of long range because it is a beachhead vehicle. Since it is slow and large and hence highly vulnerable its employment must be restricted to the beachhead. Targets outside of the beachhead can be initially engaged by naval gunfire, support aircraft and later by field artillery, tanks and self propelled artillery. Unfortunately the recoiless rifle has a violent backblast which must be considered in a closed installation.

Backblast in both recoiless weapons and rockets launchers now available to the using arm precludes the employment of such weapons in an LVT as the primary armament. During the late war, aircraft were armed with a light, short recoil, 75mm gun. It appears that such a weapon could be effectively utilized in an LVT.

In general, then, the substitute for the present LVT(A)(5) is visualized as the present LVT(3) with a 75mm howitzer or gun and reduced armor weight, such a vehicle to be retained as an interim type until improved designs finally reach the field in quantity.

In recent landing operations of the 1st Marine Division, 12 LVT(3)s and five LVT(A)(5)s were employed. In executing the landing through heavy surf

five of the LVT (3)s were swamped. A study of the causes of this accident seems to indicate that the LVT-(A)(5)s by virtue of being covered over were able to stand heavy seas better than the LVT(3)s. Waves washed *over* the LVT(A)(5)s but washed *into* the LVT(3)s.

BECAUSE OF THE RATIO of width to length, lack of maneuverability and hull design the LVT(3) in surf is best compared to an open box subject to the whims of the sea and responsive only in a minute degree to the efforts of its driver. An open LVT(3) can thus be considered dangerous in heavy surf operation.

The effect of VT fuzed projectiles bursting over troop-carrying open LVT(3)s is easily imagined. Troop density per LVT and LVT density per boat lane as witnessed during the late war indicate a very favorable target for air burst fire. On this second count, therefore, an open LVT(3) can again be considered dangerous in landing operations.

The LVT(3) is also employed in the movement of cargo from ships to inland dumps. This type of work requires ease of loading and unloading which is best exemplified by the development of the ramp type LVT. Since the LVT must float, the weight of what it can carry must be restricted. It is maintained that in the majority of cases the LVT(3) can carry in weight no more cargo than the volume capacity of the cargo compartment, usually less. Therefore a roof over the cargo compartment of the LVT(3) would not interfere with loading, unloading or cargo handling capacity.

In order to increase survival in surf, provide minimum overhead protection for assault troops and yet not interfere with cargo carrying ability, it is considered that the present cargo LVT(3) should be fitted with a light, arched, armored cover. This cover can be made detachable if so desired and should not interfere with the ramp operation or engine air intake. Further, this overhead can be fitted with escape hatches as required. Several LVTs during the late war were fitted with armored overheads and were extremely successful as communication centers for LVT battalions. Armored overheads on LVT(3)s can be installed with existing materials and facilities. The added weight would not be great enough to interfere with mechanical efficiency. The value of an armored cover in keeping assault troops dry and furnishing certain morale factor by reducing exposure to weather and gunfire is also considered worthy of note.


In conclusion, then, it is submitted that the efficiency of LVT units in event of combat within the next few years would be greatly improved by:

(a) The elimination of the present LVT(A)(5).

(b) The placing of heavy armament on certain LVT-(3)s assigned the role of the present LVT(A)(5).

(c) The addition of overhead armor cover on the cargo LVT(3).


US MC



The present LVT(A)(5) carries more armor plating than necessary, reducing its military efficiency.



A cover over the LVT(3) would prevent swamping and protect personnel from VT fuzed projectiles.



The loading and unloading of the ramp type LVT would not be handicapped by addition of cover.



Know Your Signals

By Maj James A. Donovan, Jr

"ON THE COMPANY COMMANDER'S *signal* THE TWO platoons assaulted under cover of smoke and reached the bridge."—

"The company commander is responsible that the assault is launched at the proper time. It is usually launched by subordinate commanders when within assaulting distance. Otherwise the company commander orders it by *signal* or command."—

"Upon returning from reconnaissance, the company commander directs the corporal to give him the sketches which he has made, and orders him to *signal* the company forward."—

"The enveloping squad *signals* for the fires to lift—"

"The assault companies *signal* they have landed by firing green star clusters."

These situations are repeated in varied manners time and time again in our "school solutions" and tactical training problems. Our small infantry units are always sending signals to control fire, or movements, or to transmit simple messages. But how often in this training is the "signal" that would be used in combat actually employed? Do all concerned know who would fire the signal, who would carry the signal, how the signal would be fired, and most important just what the signal might be? Do most infantry battalion marines know of all the various types of signals that are now available to them to assist in their control and movement? There are now many new types of pyrotechnics and ammunition that reached the hands of the troops very late in the war and consequently, their possibilities are not generally known to all marines. Many think of signaling in terms of Very pistol flares or ground signal pyrotechnics. For infantry purposes both of these signal means are now about as absolete as is the 1903 rifle.

Today, by means of his rifle grenade discharger, M7 or M8, the marine armed with rifle or carbine can project many types of signal ammunition that have heretofore been non-existent or dependent upon special projectors. There are now at least 14 different types and colors of signal ammunition that can be fired from rifle grenade dischargers and employed in numerous ways to assist the infantry. The possibilities of this ammunition extend from visual signal with a signal ground, white star cluster, M18A1 to target designation with a red grenade rifle smoke, streamer, M23.

The first group of the rifle grenade signal family that we shall consider is the ground signal, launcher type series. These are all pyrotechnics with characteristics that enable them to replace the old Very pistol and ground flares. This series consists of white, green, amber, or red stars made either as parachute or clusters:

Signal Ground, White Star, Parachute	M17A1
Signal Ground, White Star, Cluster	M18A1
Signal Ground, Green Star, Parachute	M19A1
Signal Ground, Green Star, Cluster	M20A1
Signal Ground, Amber Star, Parachute	M21A1

". . . Today, by means of his rifle grenade discharger, M7 or M8, the marine armed with rifle or carbine can project many types of signal ammunition that have heretofore been non-existent or dependent upon special projectors . . ."

Signal Ground, Amber Star, Cluster	M22A1
Signal Ground, Red Star, Parachute	M51A1
Signal Ground, Red Star, Cluster	M52A1

These rounds are aluminum colored with initialed and colored ends. The stabilizer assembly is closed by a cork plug which has a special cartridge attached by a metal clip. These signals when fired vertically rise to a height of 600 feet where the signal assembly is ejected and burns according to type.

Often confused with these ground signals, launcher type, are the signal ground, M17 series. These pyrotechnics are the ones more familiar to the most marines as they were used extensively during the war. The flares of this group are fired in the special ground signal discharges in which the pyrotechnics cartridge is placed and then discharged when the base is struck against the ground. The ammunition of this series is a bit smaller than the ground signal, launcher type, A1 series and is not interchangeable. However the containers are similar in appearance and the very similar nomenclature often results in the two types being confused.

Until the signal ground, M17, series are carefully weeded out of all ammunition dumps, using units must be on the alert to prevent the two types being mixed in supply.

Some consideration must be given to more specific allowances of each color of the ground signals, launcher type, in our units of fire, instead of lumping assorted colors under one total figure. For example; the white star, parachute, M17A1, is at present one of our most satisfactory and economical means of providing limited front line illumination. Instead of forward platoon leaders or company commanders having to call for naval star shells, or mortar illumination with its tell-tale trail-every time the front lines get nervous, the platoon or company commander here has a good, easily controlled, illumination flare. The use of the white star parachute flare for illumination purposes should be encouraged and a liberal amount will be required in a unit of fire.

THE AMBER STAR, parachute, M21A1 is also good for illumination in an emergency and allowances should be increased. Numbers of rounds of the other colors in a unit of fire should be determined according to a more detailed SOP covering the use of these pyrotechnics.


Another relatively new type of rifle grenade signal is the previously mentioned grenade, rifle, smoke streamer, M23. This grenade's body is a blue-grey color similar in shape to the M9A1AT grenade and is issued in four colors—violet, red, yellow, and green. The fuze is ignited by a muzzle blast from the grenade cartridge, then the grenade gives off a continuous stream of colored smoke for its full flight, burning for a minimum of twelve seconds. Its range is up to 500 feet.

This streamer grenade has many possibilities. The Marine Corps Schools teach that it is an effective means for infantry to designate targets for supporting tanks. It can also be used by riflemen to designate indistinct targets to other supporting weapons. Streamer grenades can be fired as signals to lift fires, or assault objectives. They can be fired high in the air to signal fires are falling short, or as a signal for rear units to displace forward. Their burning time and range give the streamers considerable scope as infantry signal means.

A different type of colored grenade is the M22 which comes in five colors—violet, red, yellow, green and orange. This grenade burns on impact, the fuze igniting the colored smoke mixture. The rifle grenade can also be used to designate targets or to identify objectives or control movements.

The M19 white phosphorous smoke rifle grenade also has possibilities as a signal. For example; when fired at a pillbox upon ending preparation fires and as a signal to assault. However, because of the general use of WP in operations of all types, it is better employed as a quick screening and casualty agent than as a form of signal.

Another new type signal rifle grenade is the signal ground, high burst ranging M27A1B1. This grenade is fired at a high angle and rises to 700 feet thereupon it bursts and the resultant flash and smoke can be seen and



heard a distance of 2000 yards. Not much information has been disseminated about this grenade but it can be assumed that it is intended for use in artillery and mortar observation and ranging.

We should mention here the colored smoke hand grenades which also have many of the same possibilities as do the colored smoke rifle grenades being limited only in range. The M16 comes in green, yellow, red, and violet and burns for two minutes. The colored smoke hand grenade, M18, is in the same colors and has a burning time of one minute.

These many means of executing visual signals in the hands of riflemen are, we can see, limited only by the initiative of the units concerned and adequacy of supply of the various types.

Of course with such a varied assortment of ammunition its use has to be controlled by SOP or definite signal orders. Except for special signals as called for in paragraph five of operations orders, infantry units should have SOPs that simplifies the use of these signal means. Some definite and standard uses of these items of ammunition that could be the basis of signal SOP, supply planning, and might assist in tactical training are the following:

1. Designate targets for tanks—colored smoke streamer grenades.

2. Signal to, "Lift support fires, infantry ready to assault."—Assault unit fires colored smoke streamer grenade at objective.

3. Signal to, "Displace forward," when moving machine gun sections or mortar squads by echelon—colored smoke streamer grenade fired vertically or colored smoke hand grenade in line of sight with rear echelon.

4. Designate enemy AT gun—colored smoke rifle grenade fired at enemy gun.

5. Mark front lines at request of friendly planes—colored smoke hand grenades. Reserve one color for this purpose at all times.


6. Rifle company illumination—Reserve signal ground launcher type, white star parachute M17A1 for this purpose at all times. Reserve amber star parachute M21A1 as an alternate for this purpose.

7. Signal for "friendly artillery or mortar fire falling short."—Reserve at least two signals of star parachute or star cluster type for this use and change the signal frequently.

8. Signal to begin FPL fires at night—Combination amber cluster and red star parachute.

9. Signal to cease FPL fires at night—White star cluster.

10. Signal, "Friendly patrol returning to lines."—Daytime, colored smoke streamer grenade fired towards lines, at night, amber star cluster.



11. Signal, "Friendly patrol lost, marking spot."—Colored smoke streamer grenade fired vertically, display colored smoke hand grenade or fire a high burst ranging grenade.

12. Signal, "Objective seized"—Green star cluster or colored smoke hand grenade.

13. Signal, "Request artillery to fire normal barrages."—Red star cluster.

These are just some of the many front line situations than can be assisted by visual signalling using the means now available to all units wherein men are equipped with rifle grenade launchers M7 or M8. Of course control will have to be exercised to prevent a confusion of conflicting signals and signals will have to be changed frequently to safeguard security. However, the amount of practice and planning in the use of infantry signals will be more than repaid in simplified control and communication.

Visual signalling is now limited only by your imagination and the skill with which this ammunition is employed. Does your outfit know the signals and how they may be put to good use? USMC



Probably the most important contribution this detachment makes to the Marine Corps is practical training of personnel and the provision of technical advice to Marine Air Wings on new type planes.

They Test the Jets

JUST WHEN JET-PROPELLED PLANES OF SUPERSONIC SPEED COMpletely eliminate aircraft with reciprocating engines is problematical and debatable. But you can rest assured that when all conventional engines are given the "deep six" the Marine Corps will have detailed information regarding the latest jet planes, their use and capabilities.

No, the information will not be pried out of technical manuals published by the U. S. Air Force. A large portion of the data will come from first-hand, on-the-scene reports rendered by the Marine Aviation Detachment, Naval Air Test Center, Patuxent River, Maryland.

This small Marine detachment of 11 officers and 23 men sends the Marine Corps an average of five reports each week covering the latest performance data on new aircraft and the newest wrinkles on old aircraft like the familiar F8F and F4U.

These reports flow weekly to Headquarters, Marine Corps, with copies to the 1st and 2d Marine Air Wings and the technical schools at

By Maj James A. Pounds, III

Quantico. They cover everything from engineering details of planes through their flight capabilities to detailed information on repair and maintenance. Many changes in specifications on navy aircraft originate from recommendations in these reports.

The Marine Air Detachment, Patuxent River, is a combination liaison and intelligence unit. It acts as liaison group between Naval Air Test Center and the aviation section, Headquarters, Marine Corps; and, secondly, it performs an intelligence mission in that it gathers information and assists in evaluating it. The detachment itself is an administrative unit only and assigns its personnel to the test center for operational control. The Marine personnel aid in the various test projects and prepare their reports from personal experience plus information prepared by navy fliers and technicians.

Bordered by the Patuxent River and Chesapeake Bay, the Naval Air Test Center sprawls over 6,500 acres near the site of Maryland's first settlement, St. Mary's City Scattered around a network of runaways, one of which is 9,000 feet long, are the various test divisions and their sub-divisions.

Five basic test divisions comprise the test center, commanded by RearAdm Apollo Soucek, one of the Navy's pioneer aviators. The five divisions are Flight Test, Tactical Test, Electronics Test, Armament Test and Service Test. At each of these test divisions the Marine Aviation Detachment maintains both pilots and mechanics to participate in, record and report on the latest developments in naval aviation and aircraft.

Coordinating the work of the Marines in these divisions and handling the reports is LtCol Jack R. Cram, the commanding officer, a veteran of twenty years in aviation. In addition to his regular duties LtCol Cram has assigned himself the additional duty of personally qualifying as a pilot of everything on the station that has wings.

Probably the most important contribution this detachment makes to the Marine Corps is the practical training of personnel who will be available to train other marines, and providing technical advice to the Marine Air Wings when the Marine Corps first procures the new types of aircraft and equipment.

An outstanding example of this contribution can be found in the new Marine jet squadron at Cherry Point. Its commanding officer, LtCol Marion E. Carl, the world's record speedster, spent more than a year at the test center here and was executive officer of the MAD. Twelve of LtCol Carl's mechanics currently are completing on-the-job training at the test center and soon will leave to form the nucleus of the new squadron's ground crew.

Now let us look into the individual test divisions and see what each contributes to the complete record.

The oldest test division is Flight Test where LtCol William E. Clasen and Capt Richard L. Nickerson are attached. The pilots at this division test the characteristics and capabilities of all type planes in the air to determine if they meet the specifications set forth by the Navy Department when the planes are ordered. This includes speed, rate of climb, dive angles, maneuvering ability, fuel consumption, temperature surveys, and various other tests associated with flight characteristics. Also working with this division are a number of civilian test pilots and engineers, representing the various airplane manufacturers, who are on hand to follow the tests and provide helpful hints and technical aid.

Flight Test is divided into two sections, carrier and non-carrier. The carrier section currently is hard at work adapting flight deck equipment to jet planes and vice versa. The non-carrier section gives its attention to everything from the giant Mars to helicopters. Like all divisions Flight Test maintains its own ground crews and top-notch mechanics.

Across the ramp from Flight Test is Tactical Test, also divided into carrier and non-carrier sections. This division takes new aircraft and compares them to the ones already in service with regard to combat capabilities. These tests include night flying, all-weather instrument flights, tactical evaluation of electronics and ordnance equipment, and pilot comfort.


In addition to putting the new planes through the latest combat routines Tactical Test spends considerable time devising new combat methods for the new planes. Maj Charles Kimak is the MAD pilot representative at this test unit.

One of the more highly specialized units at the test center is Electronics Test. ET, as it is known, primarily is concerned with evaluating, on the ground and in the air, all electronics equipment to determine if the manufacturer met Navy specifications regarding material, workmanship and performance.

Secondarily, the division does repair and maintenance on radar and radio equipment for other units. Attached to Electronics Test are Capt Samuel B. Folsom, Jr., and 1stLt John Seaton. Gone from ET but not forgotten is Capt Richard Hey, the number one "bug-finder" on the station. As a result of his frequent encounters with balky aircraft Capt Hey still holds the record for dunking planes in Chesapeake Bay, swimming away from them and returning to tell his superiors what was wrong with the plane.

Across the street from ET is Armament Test where all ordnance equipment from bombs and twelve-inch rockets to caliber .30 machine guns are tested. Thousands of rounds are fired from the guns of this unit for the dual purpose of testing the guns and evaluating armament on the new and speedier planes. Fire control equipment also is tested by this organization, and there is a certain overlap with Electronics Test in evaluating electronics fire control equipment.

Working with Armament Test and making runs in the



The jet-propelled Phantom makes a simulated carrier landing on the carrier mock-up at flight test division. Such landings as this will determine which planes will be used on carriers.

new jet planes is 1stLt Al Jensen. CWO Albert Straba is the Marine Corps ordnance expert at the same unit.

And last but not least important is Service Test where they delight in taking a new plane and trying to beat it to death in the shortest possible time. As the planes begin to show the strain this unit carefully records the weakness of each type aircraft from a maintenance standpoint and recommends changes in specifications and arrangement of accessories to increase the life of the plane and decrease the problem of maintenance.

Capt George Cole, veteran engineering officer of 28 years in the Corps, is attached to Service Test. To prove that you can teach an old Devildog new tricks and make him like it, Capt Cole already has expressed the opinion that jet engines are easier to overhaul and maintain than reciprocal engines.

Closely associated with the test center is a Physiological Laboratory that conducts medical research to determine the effects of new planes and their characteristics on the human beings who fly them.

THERE SELDOM is an hour of the day or night that a plane from Patuxent is not in the air. The accelerated pace at which tests are conducted is exemplified by the fact that one Service Test plane flew 103 hours in one week whereas the normal life of a carrier plane is 450 hours in the air over a period of one year.

In addition to the 100-odd Navy aircraft undergoing tests at all times the Patuxent pilots also fly Army, commercial and foreign planes as a basis of comparison.

Virtually all pilots in the Marine Detachment are working on test projects with the FH or FJ, two types of jet planes. In fact all pilots of the MAD are qualified both as jet pilots and test pilots before they leave Patuxent. Usually they are qualified in practically every type Navy aircraft now in use before their tour here is completed. Normally the first assignment a new arrival gets is to the Flight Test pilot's school.


The Marine Air Detachment arranges for "on the job" training for personnel from Marine Squadrons and Wings and arranges demonstrations for classes from the Marine Corps Schools at Quantico.

With the general trend in aviation today pointing toward 1000mph aircraft, LtCol Cram strongly believes the Navy and Marine Corps should begin immediately preparing pilots for the high speed era rather than waiting until the planes are perfected.

"It is obvious," Col Cram says, "that contact flying practically is a thing of the past even at subsonic speeds. The future pilots of jet planes will have to be expert instrument flyers because it will be impossible from an operational standpoint to satisfactorily complete missions without relying primarily on instrument flight.

"The emphasis is on aircraft, electronically-controlled sighting devices and all-weather operations, but no steps are being taken to train pilots to handle this equipment under such conditions," he said. "I firmly believe the sooner we change basic pilot training to emphasize instrument flying, with contact flying secondary, the better off we will be."

The Marine Aviation Detachment is quartered with Maj Walter M. Henderson's guard detachment at Marine Barracks. Maj Henderson's men have become somewhat air-minded as a result of flying in R4Ds and helicopters to guard wrecked aircraft and from hitch-hiking rides to leave destinations aboard R5Ds of the Naval Air Transport Service, Atlantic Wing, whose headquarters are at Patuxent River. USMC


PALESTINE
0 10 20 30 miles
International Boundary
District Boundary
Standard Gauge Railroad (4'8½")
Narrow Gauge Railroad (3'5½")
Oil Pipe Line
Intermittent Stream
Spot Heights in Meters
0 50 100 200 miles
TURKEY
Adana
Mersin
Aleppo
Latakia
CYPRUS
Homs
Tripoli
BEIRUT
LEBANON
SYRIA
DAMASCUS
MEDITERRANEAN SEA
Haifa
Tel Aviv Jaffa
AMMAN
JERUSALEM
Gaza
Port Said
Suez
PALESTINE
TRANS-JORDAN
EGYPT
Aqaba
ARABIA
Tyre
LEBANON
Az Zib
+70
LAKE HULA
1207
Safad
SYRIA
Acre
Na'amin
GALILEE
HAIFA
LAKE TIBERIAS
Nesher
Oishon
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-212
Yarmuk
Atlit
Nazareth
562
Samakh
HAIFA
Bira
Afula
Jalud
Beisan
Mifflr
Hadera
Jenin
SAMARIA
Tulkarm
Nur ash Shams
Sabastiya
940
Nablus
Farfa
JORDAN RIVER
Zerka
TRANS-JORDAN
Auja
Ras al Ein
TEL AVIV
JAFFA
Petah Tiqva
Tel Litwinsky
Kafr Jinnis
Beit Nabala
Sarafand al 'Amar
Lydda
Ramle
1016
Ramallah
LYDDA
Jericho
Rubin
814
JERUSALEM
Bethlehem
Al Majdal
JERUSALEM
1019
Hebron
-392
DEAD SEA
Gaza
Ghazza
Khan Yunis
Rafah
Beersheba
GAZA
EGYPT

Background For Palestine

By Col Manly L. Curry

THE SITUATION IN PALESTINE IS, FROM A STRATEGIC viewpoint, perhaps the most explosive in the world today. While this conflict does not in itself constitute a serious threat to U. S. security, it *could* provide the match to set off the powder keg of World War III. In strategic areas, little wars can easily grow into big ones, and the Near East* is such an area.

In 135 A.D., after a series of revolts of the Palestinian Jews against their Roman conquerors, the Emperor Hadrian decide to stamp out this stubborn Jewish nationalism and sent his legions to settle the matter. The Jews were slaughtered and their dispersion, which had already begun under Roman oppression, was completed by this disaster. Jerusalem was converted to a Roman colony.

Five hundred years later, the meteor-like rise of Mohammed unified the Arab tribes with a fierce sense of nationalism which has continued with varying degrees of intensity to the present day.

Thus were set in motion two separate and continuing chains of events, or nationalistic currents, which were destined to clash head-on in Palestine 18 centuries after the Romans had scattered the Jews from their traditional homeland. The clash of these two nationalistic movements has created what we know currently as the Palestine Question.

This struggle is not simply local friction between two different religious groups, as many have supposed. In fact there is little evidence of religious intolerance as an underlying cause. What religious friction there may be is definitely a secondary effect; the primary cause is aggressive nationalism and its implications are far-reaching.

The Development of Arab Nationalism

IN THE 7TH CENTURY A.D., fired by the religious fervor of Mohammed, the tribes of the Arabian Peninsula began a conquest which first subdued Syria, Persia, and Egypt, then swept across northern Africa, through the Iberian Peninsula into what is now France, where they were finally turned back in 732 at Poitiers by Charles Martel. Conquest also carried them eastward into India and, in barely a century following the death of the Prophet, the Arabs had established an unbroken empire from the Iberian Peninsula to the banks of the Indus. In the centuries which followed, this empire disintegrated under the pressure of Turk and Tartar. That is, it ceased to exist as a political entity but left its lasting imprint religiously and culturally. In fact, the religious feature of the conquest, known as Islam or the Mohammedan religion, was permanently embraced by most of the peoples who had come under the Arab sway.

It appears that Islam was not in fact a "new religion" but rather a renaissance of a Semitic interpretation of religion which, in predominantly Semitic countries, was threatened with extinction by the non-Semitic Greek interpretation. For millions of non-Semitic converts in the Middle East, it was, of course, a new religion and for the most part remained permanently. However that may be, it is important to note that the Semitic or Arab peoples were for the first time united by the *nationalistic* aspect of the movement, which has not always been clearly understood.

The conquest of Egypt by Selim I marked the first phase of the Ottoman absorption of the Arabian Empire.

*There is no generally accepted definition of the terms "Near East" and "Middle East," the two being used loosely and interchangeably. As used herein, Near East is intended to include: Turkey, Egypt, Levant States, Palestine, Trans-Jordan, Iraq, Saudi Arabia and the Yemen.



One of the Marine Corps' best known artillerists, Col Manly L. Curry, hails from Macon, Georgia, and graduated from the Naval Academy in 1929. Prewar foreign tours took him to Nicaragua and to France where he was a student of artillery in the Ecole de Guerre. In command of the Marine Detachment on the *Colorado* at the time of Pearl Harbor, he joined 3d Battalion, 10th Marines, early in the war and led the battalion through Tulagi, Guadalcanal, and Tarawa. Later, he was on Gen Holland M. Smith's staff at Iwo Jima, and was G-3 of the III Amphibious Corps in North China. After graduating from the National War College in 1947, he was ordered to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, his present assignment.



By 1566 Turkish dominion over the Arab states extended from Algeria to the Persian Gulf, and from Syria to the Indian Ocean. It was able to maintain its grip on all this territory until the end of the 18th Century, and on the Near East until World War I.

So much for the rise of Islam and the transfer of its leadership from Mecca, its "mother," to Constantinople, its "step-mother." Here we are primarily concerned with the Arabs and the nationalistic outgrowth of the rise of Islam, and perhaps it will make for better understanding if we define what we mean by the term "Arab." According to modern anthropologists, the majority of Arabs are "classical Mediterraneans" and there appears to be no pure Semitic or Arabian race. Semitic cultures, which first made their appearances in the Nile and Tigro-Euphrates areas, were inherited by the Semitic tribes of the Near East. The form to which this culture had evolved by the 7th Century was carried first by the tribes of Arabia in their spectacular conquest of the Near East and North Africa and impressed upon the subjugated peoples. The adoption of this culture (particularly the Arabic language), and the migration of Arabs into conquered territories, caused the countries concerned to assume Arabic characteristics. Thenceforth, the natives of such countries became known as Arabs, and the countries Arab States. Hence, Arabs may be said to be those peoples who speak the Arabic language and who share the traditions and associations of the Arab history.

At first glance it may appear that Islamization and Arabization are identical movements, or so closely related as to appear so. Actually there is a definite distinction, important for the purposes of this study. The courses of the two are parallel and at times almost inextricably entwined. The cultural evolution given impetus by the Arabs had two aspects; Islamization was purely religious while Arabization was essentially social and, as already mentioned, manifested itself both linguistically and as racial conversion. The appeal of the two was different; every country which became Arabized also became Islamized, but the converse was not true. Such countries as Iran and Afghanistan, although lastingly Islamized, were hardly affected by the Arab culture. Arabization affects some 40,000,000 people, while six times that number of widely differing races have adopted the Mohammedan faith. Of the two, Arabization is the older. Arab conquests into Syria and Persia occurred as early as the 3d Century B.C., and were followed by extensive migrations of Arabs into those areas. The rise of Islam in the 7th Century A.D. gave new vigor to the already existing Arab influences and the two forces then worked together, except that Islam went to more distant boundaries.

In the latter part of the 18th Century, Islam saw the rise of the Wahhabi movement within the Mohammedan religion. Its purpose was to rid the religion of what it considered to be corruptions of worldly rulers (i.e., the Turkish sultans). This bid to rescue the caliphate from the unworthy Turks, of course, had its inevitable nationalistic aspect, as it would tend to bring control of the Moslem world back to Arab lands.

As for these two forces today, Pan-Islamism is a dormant force which probably could be aroused by persecution, but is not now a dynamic force. It appears that Pan-Arabism is steadily replacing Pan-Islamism in the hearts of most Arabs. Whereas Pan-Islamism can appeal only to those of Mohammedan leanings, Pan-Arabism can be used as an approach to any Arab, regardless of religious convictions.

Granting that, at this time, Pan-Arabism is by far the more important of the two movements, let us examine the modern status of this movement, as it bears directly on the question under consideration. Although the Arab Empire, established in the 7th and 8th centuries, gave way to Turkish conquest, the cultural basis upon which it rested remained sound, though somewhat obscured by the passage of time. In the course of events the classical Arab language became corrupted and the written sources of Arab history and traditions were more and more neglected. However, as early as 1811 efforts were made to arouse the Arabs to revolt against the Turks. The ringleader in this attempt was Mehemed Ali, an officer in the Albanian force detailed by the Sultan of Turkey to oppose Napoleon. But this effort failed due to the opposition of Lord Palmerston, British Secretary of War; and the non-existence of national consciousness among the Arabs at the time.

The turning point was reached in 1834 when the all-important Arab national consciousness was aroused in a curious way. At this time there was in Beirut a keen rivalry among the various missionary groups for the favor of the local natives. This rivalry led to four events which reawakened Arab interest in their past history. These events were: the establishment at Beirut of the American mission's printing press; the establishment of a men's college at Aintura by the Lazarist Fathers; the establishment at Beirut by Eli Smith and his wife, of a girls' school; and finally, the initiation by Ibrahim Pasha

of a wide program of primary education for boys. All this resulted in a revival of the classical Arabic language and stimulated wide interest in the all-but-forgotten manuscripts glorifying Arabian history, both promoting nationalism.

Apparently the first organized Arab nationalist movement occurred in 1875 when five young men, educated at the Syrian Protestant College in Beirut, formed a secret society with revolutionary aims. Branches were later established in Damascus, Tripoli, and Sidon. The movement grew rapidly and after three or four years members began posting anonymous placards in the streets denouncing the Turkish government and exhorting the Arabs to revolt against it.

By 1914 such secret societies were well established and ready to play an important role in the Arab uprising which soon followed. In 1915 the Turkish Caliph of Constantinople was busily engaged in an attempt to get the Moslem world to rise in a *jihad*, or holy war, against the Allies. To offset this move, Britain entered into negotiations with King Hussein, Sharif of Mecca, to win the Moslem world away from Turkey by precipitating an Arab revolt. These negotiations took the form of a series of secret messages between Hussein and Sir Henry McMahon, High Commissioner for Egypt and the Sudan, which came to be known as the McMahon Correspondence. The basis of the Arab demands was the Damascus Protocol of 1915, drawn up by Al-Fatat and Al'Ahd, two of the above mentioned secret societies. After the war this became the subject of heated controversy and a feeling on the part of the Arabs that they had been betrayed by the British. While certain points in the negotiations might be subject to misunderstanding, there can be little doubt that both parties clearly understood that revolt was predicated upon complete and guaranteed independence for the Arab states concerned. That the Arabs failed to realize their aspirations after the war, seems to be due to the fact that France, Britain, and Tsarist Russia had previously concluded secret agreements with a view toward partitioning that part of the then Ottoman Empire on the eastern end of the Mediterranean. With the withdrawal of Russia following her revolution, this agreement became known as the Sykes-Picot Agreement, which envisaged the placing of the Holy Land under some form of international administration in the setting up of which France, Britain and the Sharif of Mecca were to have their say. Upon the collapse of the Tsarist regime in Russia, the Bolsheviks publicly announced the existence of this secret agreement. The Arabs maintain that the British broke faith with them. Certainly the Arab argument is a strong one. In essence, the controversy hinged on the question of whether or not Syria and Palestine (which became mandates of France and Britain respectively) were included in the Arab territory to be given complete freedom. Whatever the merits of the Sykes-Picot controversy may be, the Arabs did not achieve their aim of complete independence following World War I. The problem was not susceptible of so simple a solution.

In an attempt to appease the empire builders and at the same time provide for the rights of small nations and to satisfy the lofty language which clothed Allied war aims, the League of Nations evolved the mandate system. The secret agreements of the victorious Allies would be followed in any case.

The long delay in granting Palestine independence from her mandate status has been a constant source of deep suspicion toward Britain on the part of the other Arab states.

This brings us to the present-day status of the Pan-Arab movement. The Arab aims as set forth in the Damascus Protocol of 23 May 1915, and which served as the basis of Arab negotiations with McMahon, envisaged the formation of a single Arab state in the territory now occupied by the various independent Arab states and Palestine. However, as a result of the Peace Conference of 1919, Syria was mandated to France and Palestine to Britain in 1922, and Iraq to Britain in 1924.

By 1938, British prestige in the Near East had been so undermined by Axis propaganda that she sought to strengthen her position by promoting the Pan-Arab Movement and took steps in this direction at the time of the Palestine Conference in London (1938-39). This movement is now the keystone of British policy in the Near East. The movement was originally opposed by the French because of rivalry with the British in the Levant, but since the French mandate (Syria) became independent during World War II, this is no longer a consideration. It was also opposed by Turkey as the movement is inherently anti-Turkey. At the moment, however, Turkey is on friendly relations with Britain and there is little likelihood of friction on this point. Rapprochement between the Allies (or rather Britain and the United States) and the Arabs was effected by publication of the Atlantic Charter. Britain's support of the Pan-



Arab Movement is approved in principle by the United States. The U.S.S.R., so far, has not publicly opposed it.

Encouraged by Britain, a League of Arab States was established on 23 March 1945, meeting for the first time in Cairo. The announced aims of this organization as outlined in their part are "to strengthen the ties among Arab states" and the "support and stabilization of ties upon a basis of independence, sovereignty, common good, improvement of status, security, and realization of aspirations and hopes." They are to cooperate on "economic and financial affairs, communications, cultural affairs, nationality (passports, extradition of criminals, etc.), social affairs, and health problems."

Signatories to this pact include Syria, Transjordan, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Lebanon, Egypt, and the Yemen. Since Palestine is not yet independent, it is not included as a full-fledged member, but provisions are made to look after her interests as an Arab state.

It is this Arab nationalism, symbolized by the League of Arab States, which comes face to face with Jewish nationalism, symbolized by Zionism, with Palestine as its battleground, as we shall presently see.

The Development of Jewish Nationalism

THE OTHER MAJOR ELEMENT in the Palestine Question is the Jewish nationalism represented by the Zionist Movement, and to get a clear picture of this we must make a brief review of Jewish history.

Although the monotheistic Jewish religion originated among the Semitic tribes of Palestine, and hence leads us to suppose that there is a strong ethnic relationship between Jews and Arabs, there is actually considerable controversy concerning Jewish racial composition. Some authorities suggest that there was, in the course of events, a mixture in the Caucasus rather than in Palestine, as there is a strong resemblance between Jews and Armenians. Actually there are two general types of Jews, the dark Semitic type with fine noses, and the Armenoid type with coarser noses and an appearance of blondness.

Already, before the destruction of Jerusalem by the Romans under Hadrian, the *Diaspora*, or dispersion of the Jews, had become a familiar phenomenon in Europe as indicated by numerous Latin writers of the period. Jewish captives of innumerable wars were scattered throughout the empire as slaves, and were followed by merchants and traders. By 400 A.D. Palestine had ceased to be the center of Jewish life because of Roman economic and religious action directed against them. Even a century earlier, Jewish settlements were to be found as far away as Spain and the Rhine; and, before the Roman Empire had begun to crumble, they were to be found in all the larger European cities. Actually, the Jews did not fare badly in this early period. By the Roman constitution of Caracalla (212 A.D.), they were admitted to the privileges as well as the burdens of Roman citizenship, and occupied a position favored with respect to other religious minorities in the Roman Empire. But the pendulum of Jewish fortunes swung continuously through the centuries. As the Roman Empire became Christianized, the Jews became the object of papal control. It is significant that it was not the aim of the Church at this time to destroy the Jews but rather to convert them. If the Papacy followed a discriminatory policy toward them, it also posed as the protector of Judaism and disapproved the use of force to bring about their conformity. Unfortunately, secular rulers following the differentiatory policy of the Church were not concerned with the preservation of the Jews, and discrimination quickly degenerated into persecution, particularly in the Byzantine Empire.

The ideas of Jewish inferiority embodied in the Codex Theodosianus soon colored western law. A brief respite from persecution was afforded by the barbarian invasions which upset the Roman hegemony, as the new rulers initially displayed a tolerance toward Jews, born of indifference. However, by the 7th Century, the fortunes of the Jews had again changed under a widespread wave of forced conversion, reaching its height under the barbarians in Spain where the Jewish religion was completely suppressed. At this point, salvation for the Jews appeared in the form of the Arab invasion. Following this the Jews enjoyed an unprecedented freedom, marked by an intellectual renaissance among them. This proved to be very much to the advantage of administration in Spain, where Jews were admitted to high civil positions at the time. This rebirth of Jewish culture was also evident farther north in Europe, although more confined to religious study there. Concurrently, Jews in western Europe were found among the learned professions in considerable numbers. Farther east, the Jews, having arrived in countries already inhabited under a feudal system, and enjoying less freedom than in the west, naturally drifted into commerce. However, with the growth of an indigenous mercantile class from which they became excluded, they were forced to invest their capital in loans for interest, the only means remaining open to them. This tended to create prejudice against them, as the practice was then frowned upon.

Following the Norman conquest of Britain, the pendulum began again to swing against the Jews, although they had by this time become an essentially European people. Paradoxically, the Christian religion, based on love and tolerance, became a source of terror for the Jew. The old restrictions were renewed. Gentiles were forbidden to subordinate themselves to Jews in any way, the latter being required to wear a distinctive badge and to concentrate in ghettos. With the First Crusade, there began a long series of widespread massacres of the Jews tending to drive them back to the East. In Spain, where


some of the less stout-hearted Jews sought to escape by formally embracing Christianity, the infamous Inquisition was introduced in 1478 to ferret out those who remained faithful at heart to the religion of their ancestors. All this tended to keep the Jews segrated from the peoples among whom they lived.

OVER ALL, the Jews fared better at the hands of the Moslems. Mohammed, who had borrowed much from Jewish traditional monotheistic practices and form, set out to win Jewish support for his new movement. Failing in this, he sought to destroy them. But, in the end, Mohammedans became tolerant toward the Jews, according them a sort of second-class citizenship in Moslem communities.

EUROPEAN SOCIAL UPHEAVAL in the form of the French Revolution marked the dawn of an era of emancipation for Jewry. The above mentioned restrictions on Jews, prevalent with variations in all European countries, began to be loosened when the National Assembly in 1791 enfranchised French Jews, and this liberalistic trend continued to a climax with the Treaty of Versailles in 1919. Attainment of political equality in England, the last country reached by the westward sweep of Jewish migration, was a slow process. As early as 1753, a bill was introduced to naturalize foreign-born Jews in England, but it was not until 1855 that all municipal offices were open to Jews. By 1871 Jews were admitted as scholars and fellows to British universities, and by 1890 Jews were eligible to all offices except that of King of England. Central and western European countries had granted comparable rights to their Jewish inhabitants by 1870. Unfortunately, the mass of the Jews lived in eastern Europe in Russia, Poland and Rumania and here they had made little progress since mediaeval times. Russia inherited the largest share of Jews when she participated in the partition of the old Polish republic in 1772. Russia remained bitterly anti-Jewish, the Romanoff Tsars adopting the policy of making the Jews their scape-goats, allegedly the cause of Russia's troubles. Needless to say, Russian Jews suffered at the hands of officialdom and peasantry alike. These Jews were emancipated for the first time in 1917, when Russian defeat precipitated the Bolshevik Revolution.

For the Jew, liberalism brought its reaction; the pendulum again began to swing against him. For 15 centuries, Church and State had conducted prolonged and systematic campaigns designed to debase him in the eyes of the Gentile. When emancipation was finally a reality, Jew and Gentile found much difficulty adjusting themselves to each other. The fact that the vast majority did so successfully is a fine tribute to the progress made by both Christianity and Democracy since the birth of Christ. However, as might be expected, there was a minority whose members could not adjust themselves to the new order of things, particularly when the Jew proved himself to be an able competitor. It is this minority which has created the modern movement of anti-Semitism—actually a continuation of the age-old prejudices against the Jew. There is, however, a notable difference in attitude. The modern anti-Semite claims a rational approach, based not on blind prejudice but on scientific reasoning. According to this "intellectual," the Jew is objectionable on cultural and biological grounds and can only contaminate the world. Under Hitler, who borrowed a page from the Romanoff note book, this line of propaganda reached its highest pitch. Unfortunately, it was not confined to the Nazi, unscrupulous politicians anywhere finding it a convenient device for rabble rousing. Whereas early anti-Semitism, as exercised by the Church, sought to preserve the Jew and convert him, modern anti-Semitism seeks to destroy him.

Just as Liberalism had its reaction in anti-Semitism, so has anti-Semitism its reaction in the form of Zionism, which orients the Jew toward Palestine. Zion was originally the name of the Jebusite stronghold at Jerusalem captured by David. Later it became a synonym for Jerusalem, traditional home of the Jewish religion. Zionism is the attachment of the Jews to their "homeland," manifesting itself in various heroic episodes throughout their ancient history. In mediaeval and modern times this



attachment to the birthplace of Judaism has appeared in various forms, sometimes as a yearning to return "home" to escape persecution, sometimes as a renaissance of Hebrew culture, and sometimes as aggressive nationalism. Generally all three elements have been present, but with differing emphasis depending upon the current fortunes of the Jews in their adopted homes.

During the persecution of the Middle Ages the national yearning was generally strong but futile. For example, in the 16th Century, David Reubeni set himself up as would-be liberator of the people, and again in 1666 Sabbatai Sebi proclaimed himself the Messiah. Although both enjoyed enthusiastic response from European Jewry, neither was able to lead his people back to Palestine. Nevertheless, nationalism was intense in both cases.

A MARKED CHANGE in the form of Zionism accompanied the liberalistic period when Jews were winning political recognition. Moses Mendelssohn (1729-1786) worked to qualify the Jews as citizens of the countries in which they were emancipated, emphasizing the necessity for westernization on the practical plane while adhering to the spiritual aspects of Judaism. His efforts were so successful that the Jewish Sanhedrin convened by Napoleon practically renounced Jewish nationalism. However, this apparent suppression of Jewish nationalism was in fact a change in its form. In promoting the cultural and spiritual side of Jewish life, a fresh interest was aroused in Hebrew history, which led to the revival of race consciousness. At this time, interest in Palestine was mainly idealistic and directed toward preserving the traditional Holy Places.

With the subsequent rise of anti-Semitism, Zionism again became a politico-nationalist movement with Palestine as a refuge from oppression. In 1882, Leo Pinsker of Odesso proposed that the Jewish problem be solved by the re-establishment of the Jewish nation on Jewish soil. Soon a start toward implementation was made by the formation of the *Choveve Zion* (Lovers of Zion) organization to promote the return of the Jews to Palestine. In 1897 progress was marked by the establishment of the First International Zionist Congress in Basle, Switzerland, at which time Zionist aims were formalized as follows:

> "Zionism strives to create for the Jewish people a home in Palestine secured by public law. The Congress contemplates the following means to the attainment of this end:
>
> (1) The promotion on suitable lines of the colonization of Palestine by Jewish agricultural and industrial workers.
>
> (2) The organization and the binding together of the whole of Jewry by means of appropriate institutions, local and international, in accordance with the laws of each country.
>
> (3) The strengthening and fostering of Jewish national sentiment and consciousness.
>
> (4) Preparatory steps toward obtaining government consent where necessary to the attainment of Zionism."

In 1902 the Turkish Sultan, Abdul Hamid, was approached by the Zionists in an effort to gain their ends in Palestine, then a part of the Ottoman Empire; but the negotiations were fruitless. The British government proved to be more cooperative when Dr Herzl sought a grant of territory later from that country. Consideration was given to the possible establishment of a home for the Jews on the Sinai Peninsula, near the Holy Land. However, inadequate water supply precluded the use of this area. Shortly thereafter, Joseph Chamberlain suggested the uninhabited highlands of East Africa, and in 1903 Britain made a provisional offer to the Zionists of a 6,000 square-mile area of the Guas Ngishu Plateau. Although appreciated as a gesture of good will toward the Jews, the offer precipitated a sharp controversy within Zionist ranks, the majority feeling that there could be no wavering from the goal of Palestine. The project was shelved by the 7th Zionist Congress in 1905; thereafter, Zionist effort was concentrated on Palestine.

IT IS NOTEWORTHY that Zionists tended to fall generally into two classes. From the outset, the "political" Zionists had worked to set up a home for the Jews in Palestine based on a carefully-laid diplomatic basis, having the approval of the Great Powers. As opposed to these, "practical" Zionists have emphasized the importance of getting concrete results and this element made a start at colonization by establishing a Zionist Agency in Jaffa in 1908. After that date, the main effort was directed toward colonization, although not to the exclusion of political effort. In fact it is largely the success of the "practical" Zionists, in increasing the Jewish population in Palestine five-fold since 1914, that has precipitated the present Jewish-Arab conflict.

As a final note on Zionism, let it be understood that all Jews are not Zionists. Certain respected Jewish organizations are anti-Zionist, while on the other hand, certain Christian church groups are actively sympathetic toward Zionism. Furthermore, all Zionists are by no means extremists. On 29 October 1946 the Zionist Inner Council denounced terrorists "without reservation" and appealed to Jewish communities to "isolate these groups and deny them all encouragement, support and assistance."

Recent Events in Palestine

IT WAS NATURAL that the two opposing streams of Arabic and Jewish nationalism, following devious courses for centuries, should ultimately clash in Palestine. Its capital, Jerusalem, "the bride of kings, the mother of prophets," 3,300 years old, has endured 20 seiges and 18 reconstructions, during which its religion has changed

six times. It has experienced two periods of utter desolation following destruction at the hands of Nebuchadnezzar and Hadrian. Today it remains the seat of ecclesiastical authority of diverse faiths. In addition to being the residence of the chief rabbis of the Jewish community, it is the third holy city of Islam (after Mecca and Medina). Also to be found here are the Patriarchs of the Roman Catholic and Greek Orthodox faiths.

Palestine is about the size of Vermont. Of its population of 1,750,000 in 1944, 1,061,277 were Moslem, 528,702 were Jewish and 135,547 were Christian. Jewish-owned land, which totalled 177 square miles in 1914, had increased to 545 square miles by 1936. The size of the almost completely Jewish city of Tel Aviv, which had a population of about 2,000 in 1914, had by 1945 increased to 155,277, thus nearly equalling the population of 155,314 found at Jerusalem.

The League of Nations approved the British mandate for Palestine, and it came into full operation on 29 September 1923. The Mandate was scheduled to end on 15 May 1948. Since assuming responsibility for Palestine, the British have found it an almost constant source of trouble and there is little doubt that His Majesty's Government will be happy to lay down its burdens in this area.

Although the underlying cause of trouble in the Holy Land may be attributed to the almost inevitable clash of nationalistic movements of Jews and Arabs in this area, the immediate cause (for which Britain is blamed) lies in conflicting commitments made to the Jews and Arabs during World War I by the British. We have already touched on the promises made to the Arabs in the McMahon Corespondence. Conflict has grown out of the historic Balfour Declaration, or rather the Zionist interpretation of it, made on 2 November 1917 by Mr Arthur Balfour, then Foreign Secretary, to Lord Rothschild. Its wording should be carefully noted:

> "His Majesty's Government view with favour the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people, and will use their best endeavours to facilitate the achievement of that object, it being understood that nothing shall be done which may prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine, or the rights and political status enjoyed by the Jews in any other country."

This declaration was endorsed by the principal Allied Powers, embodied in the Treaty of Sévres, and led directly to the establishment of the British mandate under authority of the League of Nations. Thereupon the Zionist organization sent a commission to Palestine to act as a link between the British Government and the Jewish people.


The British administration of Palestine, left in a most difficult situation without precedent, was from the outset assailed on one side by the "practical" Zionist demanding an immediate and practical interpretation of the Balfour Declaration, and on the other by the "political" Zionist demanding a postponement of implementation until the Great Powers could agree on an interpretation of the declaration. However, the "practical" Zionists got results. Jewish immigration to Palestine from 1918 to 1936 numbered some 280,000 and of these 61,845 arrived in 1935. Between 1920 and 1933 new Jewish industrial enterprises totalled 4,055.

This rapid increase of the Jewish population in Palestine, led, of course, to friction with the Arabs, who had harbored a deep suspicion of the British government ever since its issuance of the Balfour Declaration. In 1920 Arab riots took place in April in Jerusalem, at which time the British garrison at Semakh was attacked.

THE ARAB STAND on the question has been consistent from the start. They maintain that a solemn promise was given them that all Arab states, including Palestine, were to be granted independence. They have, in general, shown themselves willing to accord minority rights to the Jews in Palestine, allowing them a just representation in the government, but the League of Arab States is adamant against partition, threatening to oppose it with force.

For their part, the Zionists have maintained their right to set up an independent Jewish state in Palestine, although they are willing to compromise on partition.

Caught in this dilemma, policy of the British Government toward Palestine has varied depending on circumstances. Even before the mandate was approved by the League of Nations, a statement of policy was issued interpreting the Balfour Declaration as meaning "not the





imposition of a Jewish nationality upon the inhabitants of Palestine as a whole, but further development of the existing Jewish community, in order that it may become a centre in which the Jewish people, as a whole, may take, on grounds of religion and race, an interest and a pride." This stand was further clarified by Winston Churchill while holding the Colonial secretaryship (1921-1922), when he said:

> "The nationality to be acquired by all citizens of Palestine, whether Jews or non-Jews, whether for purposes of internal law or international status, would be Palestinian and nothing else . . . But in order that the Jewish community (in Palestine) should have the best prospect of free development it is essential that it should know that it is in Palestine as a right and not on sufferance. That is the reason why it is necessary that the existence of a Jewish national home in Palestine should be internationally guaranteed . . . ."

An Arab delegation in London at the time, and committed to a retraction of the mandate, rejected the statement.

The increasing pressure of Jewish immigration resulted in Arab riots in 1929 in Jerusalem, Hebron, and Safad. An investigating commission headed by Sir Walter Shaw recommended closer control of Jewish immigration, which recommendation was accepted by the government and followed by a Zionist protest. The following year, Sir John Hope Simpson, sent to investigate the continuing agitation upheld the government's position. A year later Ramsey MacDonald gave an interpretation of policy more favorable to the Zionists which brought an angry outburst from the Arabs.

JUST PRIOR to World War II, Nazi persecution increased the pressure of Jewish immigration; and the progressive independence gained by other Arab States increased the dissatisfaction of the Arabs in Palestine. In 1936 there occurred an Arab revolution, accompanied by a prolonged strike and involving considerable numbers of British troops. Lord Peel was sent to investigate. In his report rendered in June of 1937 he concluded that the positions of Jews and Arabs was irreconcilable and recommended partition. As might be expected ,this resulted in increased Arab violence requiring an augmentation of British military forces in the area. The next year Sir John Woodhead headed a commission to study means to accomplish partition, but his report failed to present a clear-cut plan. About ten months later the Arab Congress for the Defense of Palestine met in Cairo and demanded abrogation of the Balfour Declaration and cessation of Jewish immigration.

The British Government again changed its tack, deciding that partition was impracticable and that an effort should be made to promote a direct understanding between Jews and Arabs. Accordingly in 1939 delegates from the contending factions were invited to meet in London with this in view. At this time, the Arabs proposed that Palestine should be independent, and that the Jews should enjoy full minority rights with cultural autonomy for a Jewish national home in its 1939 extent. The Zionists, for their part, insisted on the establishment of an independent Jewish state in Palestine. Failing to get an acceptable compromise between these two stubborn antagonists, the British Government, on 17 May 1939 issued its White Paper policy on Palestine and to which it has generally adhered since. It stated in effect that the establishment of a Jewish state in Palestine would be contrary to the British obligations to the Arabs. It provided for the establishment, within ten years, of an independent Palestine in which Jews and Arabs alike would share authority in the government, and with complete security for the essential interests of both. To deal with the immediate problem of Jewish immigration, it provided that an additional 75,000 Jewish immigrants would be admitted during the next five years, but that illegal immigration would be checked.

Quite naturally, the Palestine Question became overshadowed by the events of World War II, only to have its smoldering embers burst into flame upon the termination of hostilities. Having never accepted the White

Paper policy, Jewish extremists became active in agitating the Jewish population in Palestine and 1945—1947 witnessed a continuous series of violent acts perpetrated by both sides, and with British patience wearing thin. In 1946 another of the numerous investigating committees was formed, being a joint Anglo-American organization this time. After having taken testimony in London, Vienna, Berlin, Prague, Warsaw, and the capitals of the Arab States, it published its report on March 29. The committee unanimously recommended, (1) the issuance of 100,000 immigration certificates to Jewish victims of Fascist and Nazi oppression, and (2) the continuance of the mandate pending the execution of an U. N. trusteeship agreement, adding that "any attempt to establish either an independent Palestine state or independent Palestine states would result in civil strife such as might threaten the peace of the world." Concurrently, Jewish extremists maintained a campaign of terror against the British administration, to the dismay of the more conservative Zionist element who openly denounced them. The Zionist extremists reiterated their purpose of winning unrestricted immigration rights and of setting up an independent Jewish majority state. On the Arab side, Ibn Saud of Arabia and Farouk of Egypt issued a joint declaration reiterating that "Palestine is an Arab country," and pledged Arab support of their brethren in Palestine. The United States, with interests in both causes, became more and more openly involved, both Herbert Morrison and Winston Churchill telling the House of Commons, in effect, that the U. S. should share Britain's burdens in this matter, that the success of any plan would depend upon American participation in its execution. Morrison had attempted to change the British policy back to one of partition, while the realistic Churchill had proposed that Britain's mandate be turned over to the U. N.

To emphasize its determination, the Jewish underground blew up part of the King David Hotel in Jerusalem containing the British military headquarters and the civil secretariat, killing 91 and injuring 45. Thereupon the much harassed British Lion roared back to the effect that it would "no longer tolerate this attempt to force its hand in framing a new policy for Palestine" and began diverting new Jewish arrivals to Cyprus, 3,800 having arrived in July.

As a counter-proposal to the recommendations of the Anglo-American investigating committee, the Jewish agency had urged the issuance of the 100,000 immigration certificates on the basis of the creation of "a viable Jewish state in control of its own immigration and economic policies in an adequate area of Palestine instead of the whole of Palestine." On October 4, President Truman cabled Prime Minister Atlee in support of this Jewish stand. A few days later he wrote a letter to King Ibn Saud urging him to accept the same proposal.

On Christmas Eve, the Zionist Congress in Basle adjourned after having boycotted the London conference on Palestine in January, condemning terrorism and the British administration in Palestine and opposing any U. N. trusteeship of the Holy Land. Instead of partition of Palestine, the delegates asked for independence.

With the beginning of 1947, Foreign Secretary Bevin made another try. He proposed to divide the country into autonomous Jewish and Arab areas without definite boundaries, and to admit 100,000 Jews every two years. If the plan didn't work after five years, the problem would be turned over to the U. N. Trusteeship Council. The plan was rejected by both sides.

All other approaches to the problem having failed, the United Nations began to take an active part about March 1947, at which time plans were made and tentatively approved for still another investigation. On May 15, a special meeting of the General Assembly of the U. N. ordered the investigation, the report of which was rendered on Ausgut 31 and recommended, that (1) Palestine should be removed from British mandate and made independent, with Jewish and Arab communities separated politically but united economically, (2) protection of religious minorities and holy places should be guaranteed



throughout an independent Palestine, and (3) the General Assembly should help 250,000 distressed European Jews. In rendering this report, the majority favored separate states; the minority advocated federation.

Reaction to the U. N. plan to partition Palestine was prompt and violent. The Arab High Commissioner of Palestine, represented by Vice Chairman Jamal-el-Husseini informed the Assembly's Palestine Commission, at Lake Success, N. Y., that Arabs would fight to prevent the Holy Land's reorganization except as an independent, unpartitioned state under the present Arab majority. Furthermore, the Arab League headquarters in Cairo announced on January 15, 1948 that the regular armies of its members would occupy all of Palestine as soon as the British withdrew. The British showed no inclination to prolong their stay in Palestine beyond the deadline of 15 May 1948.

Following the U. N. decision, the Jewish Agency for Palestine announced reluctant acceptance of the partitioning into two separate states as, "one of the sacrifices designed to find a way out of the present intolerable impasse. . ." Dr Abba Hillel Silver, the Agency's American Section Chairman, told the Palestine Commission of the U. N. that the Jewish community was ready for immediate independence, being "prepared to defend itself." Moshe Shertok, Political Director of the Jewish Agency, on January 15, 1948, laid the Jewish defense problem before the Palestine Commission of the U. N., requesting either an international army to enforce partition or the authorization for the Jewish militia to import arms for self defense. About the same time, Trygve Lie, Secretary General for the U. N., told the Palestine Commission that it had a right to expect the Security Council to back it up with troops if necessary.

Meanwhile, destruction and bloodshed continued on an ever-increasing scale. By the time the U. N. had decided on partition, casualties had run into thousands, including over 600 deaths. Property damage was counted in millions of dollars. There was abundant evidence of increased military efficiency on both sides, due in no small measure to a steady flow of arms and munitions from various sources. Internal dissention on both sides probably kept matters from being worse than they were, as members of the Arab League apparently still disagree as to the retaliatory measures to take, while there is evidence of a widening rift between the Zionist moderates and extremists. The Zionist moderates look to the Western Powers for a solution; it is not unreasonable to suppose that the extremists may turn to the U. S. S. R. in desperation.

USMC

New River Landing—1862

continued from back cover

by keeping the rebels from placing their battery in position. At dark I took one of my prize schooners alongside and proceeded to take everything out of the *Ellis* excepting the pivot gun, some ammunition, two tons of coal and a few small arms. Steam and anchor again failed to get my vessel afloat. I felt confident that the Confederates would come on me in overwhelming force, and it now became my duty to save my men. So all hands were called to muster, and the crew told that they could go aboard the schooner. I called for six volunteers to remain with me on board and fight the remaining gun. Knowing that it was almost certain death the men came forward, and two master's mates, Valentine and Barton, were amongst the number. These gentlemen subsequently behaved with coolness and bravery.

"I ordered the schooner to drop down the channel out of range from the bluffs and there to wait for the termination of the impending engagement, and if we were destroyed to proceed to sea. Early in the morning the enemy opened upon us from four points with heavy rifled guns (one a Whitworth). It was a cross fire and very destructive. I replied as best as I could, but in a short time the engine was disabled, and she was much cut up in every part and the only alternatives left were, surrender or a pull of one and a half miles, under their fire, in my small boat. The first of these was not, of course, to be thought of, the second I resolved to attempt, I fired the *Ellis* in five places and having seen that the battle flag was still flying, trained the gun upon the enemy so that the vessel might fight herself after we had left, and started down the river, reached the schooner and made sail for sea. It was low water on the bar, and a heavy surf was rolling in, but the wind forced us through after striking several times. We were just in time, for about six hundred yards down the beach were several companies of cavalry trying to reach the mouth of the inlet in time to cut us off. We hoisted our flag, gave three cheers and were off. In four hours I reached Beaufort. . . .

"At 9 a.m. the United States steamer *Ellis* was blown in pieces by the explosion of the magazine."

EHS

Base Plate McGurk . . .

Company Office Hours

SOME BIRDS KNOW HOW TO RUN COMPANY OFFICE hours better than others, and the results accomplished depend on the ability of the company commander concerned. However, when I hear the opinion that company office hours are just a waste of time since a company commander cannot award punishment, I burn. Not that I claim to be an expert on the subject, but by watching gents like Dusty Rhoades and Johnny Johnson as well as by a little thinking on my part, I have developed a few "wrinkles" that work pretty well for me.


Now I'll agree that if all you do is to have the culprit marched in, decide that he's probably guilty, give him a growl, and run him up to the "old man," then company hours are just a waste of time. Since this treatment probably does more harm than good, it would be much simpler just to have the bird marched straight to the battalion commander's office hours and meet him there. Obviously, however, there are better ways of doing it, and I'd like to talk about the system we use in our battalion.

When one of the men is run up for company office hours, there are several things we do before we even see the man. The first step is to find out all we can about the man's background. I usually start on this by checking the man's record book since it is just possible that this may be one of the reasons we have record books. By doing this it can be determined how long he's been in service, whether he's married or single, his age, what type of duty he's had and how well he performed it, whether or not he's been in trouble before, and a lot of other dope. Of course, we all know what we can find in a record book, but the point I'm making here is that we should get all the dope we possibly can about the man concerned. Since we can't do this by just looking through a record book, we also talk to the man's platoon commander and NCOs. From them we can find out a lot of things the record book doesn't show. For instance, we can get facts about his personality, his abilities present and potential, his character, ambitions, and habits. With all of this dope we are able to form a pretty complete picture of the man, and we are ready to take our next step. Before going on, however, I'd like to point out that all this isn't intended to mean that we shouldn't know all of our men before they come up for office hours or that the only time we should become really acquainted with them is if they do get out of line. It goes without saying, of course, that none of us can hope for even partial success in running a company unless we know every individual in it as an individual and not as just a warm body provided by the USMC to fill up the T/O. However, no matter how well we think we know the individual concerned, I still believe that we should carry out this first step so that we can be sure that no item has been overlooked that might have a bearing on the case.

Our next step is to determine, if possible, why the man might have committed whatever offense is being charged against him. We stress this "might have committed" in our outfit because it's sometimes easy to forget that the basis of our laws is that a man is innocent until proven guilty. Anyhow, as I said, in this step we try to determine the reason. For example, if a man is run up for drunkenness, it might be that he has financial or family worries. Of, course, it might just as well be that he has a great thirst, or that he hasn't learned his saturation point yet, or even that he just plain likes to get "beating-grandma drunk," as Boat Space calls it. If a man is run up for not having a haircut it might be that he doesn't know where the barber shop is located. Of course, there's a much better chance that his girl likes long hair, or that he fancies that he looks like some movie star, or that his mama told him he might catch cold "with one of those horrid crew cuts." Anyway, whatever it is, we try to determine the reason. Naturally the groundwork we laid during our first step helps a great deal. If we are able to figure out why this bird might have stepped off base, it makes our third step easier.

Even if we have been unable to determine the reason, we still go ahead with this next step, which is trying to determine the best approach. By this I mean we try to figure out the best way to handle the man. Now we've all seen not only company commanders but also higher com-

Even though a company commander cannot award punishment, preliminary office hours are not a waste of time if properly handled. McGurk believes in finding out why the man "might have committed" the offense for which he as been run up



If the man turns out to be innocent, loud shouts and fist-banging will seem ridiculous. If each individual is handled correctly it will add dignity to the company commander's position.

manders who use the same system for every man and for every case. Some fresh caught youngster who is run up for having rust on his trigger guard will get the same treatment as a three cruise man who is run up for giving a policeman a root in the snoot. By treatment I don't mean they will get the same sentence, but I do mean they'll get the same growls, or threats, or lectures, depending upon which technique the commander concerned has adopted as his solution to disciplinary problems. Naturally this is the easy way out, and it calls for a minimum of mental effort plus absolutely no imagination. To say that this system accomplishes nothing would be very unfair indeed, since maybe about five per cent of the time it will be the right treatment for the individual on the carpet. It also accomplishes something in regards to the other 95 per cent of the cases in that it will make them repeaters instead of just one offense boys.

All of this boils down to the fact that every case must be dealt with individually. Determining the best approach will be influenced by how much we learned about the man in step number one and how accurately we were able to determine the reason in step number two. Now maybe you've gone along with us on these first two steps but at this point you're wondering why we think this step is important. Well, in the first place, if we can determine the best way to handle the individual we'll stand a better chance of getting all of the facts in the case. This, of course, will make it easier for us to be fair in our decisions. In the second place, whether the man turns out to be innocent or guilty, if we handle the individual correctly it will add dignity to our positions as company commanders and meaning to our company office hours. There is nothing that makes a commander look more ridiculous than for him to shout and bang his fists on the desk at some poor bird only to have it turn out that it was a big misunderstanding and the man is really innocent.

Now we're finally ready to start our company office hours. We have the man's record book handy as well as the notes we made concerning him. Before us is the charge against him. Standing by our desk is the man's platoon commander. The first sergeant marches him in and halts him before our desk. We read the charges to him and ask him what he has to say. Maybe he's got plenty to say, but then again maybe "the accused stood mute," or as the happychappies say, "the amused stood cute." Anyway, suppose he won't talk. Maybe he's being surly and the easiest thing to do is to find him guilty and prepare to take the next step. On the other hand, maybe he's just plain scared stiff and really not guilty at all. In any case we've got to remember that he's innocent until proven guilty, so we must try and get him to tell his side of the story.

After we talk it over we arrive at the conclusion that he is not guilty, that he is guilty, or that we can't decide whether he's guilty or not. Let's take each of these in turn.

If the man turns out to be innocent we dismiss him without any more chin chat unless, however, he is guilty of having given false impression. If he is responsible for getting himself falsely accused he should be read off promptly and thoroughly. In any case, if it is apparent that the platoon commander did not make a careful enough investigation before running the man up to you, Lieutenant Platoon Commander should be given the word after the enlisted personnel clear your office.

If we decide the man is guilty, the seriousness of his offense will determine our next step. If the offense is one that requires punishment we will, of course, run him up for battalion commander's office hours since a company commander cannot legally award punishment whereas, a battalion commander can. However, many minor offenses require corrective measures rather than punishment. For example, if a man is run up for a minor violation of customs and courtesies we may require him to report every day after recall to the duty NCO for an hour's special instruction. If he is run up for having a dirty rifle, we may require him to report every day at 1800 to the duty NCO and have his rifle inspected. If he's run up for having dirty clothes we may require him to wash clothes after recall under the supervision of his squad leader. If you think this is unfair to the squad leader just remember that he is supposed to be looking after his men. After this treatment, you can bet your boondockers that that squad leader will allow no dirty gear in his squad. Incidentally, from the battalion commander's viewpoint herein lies the value of company office hours because it keeps these minor cases from taking up his time and effort.

Now, of course, none of this is punishment since the man is being required to do only that which he is normally expected to do. Therefore, in addition to this, the man should be given a good pep talk. If we have been able to determine the proper approach to the individual concerned these little talks can be very valuable. Some men will respond to an appeal to their pride, others to an appeal to their loyalty, ambition, or intelligence. Everyone has a chink in his armor some place, and I am sure that if you can find that opening, you'll make a more lasting impression than if you scream like a banshee.

If, however, we are unable to decide whether or not the man is guilty and if the offense is serious enough to warrant punishment, the man should be run up to the battalion commander for office hours. Many times the battalion commander will be able to discover the right answer. Furthermore, if he can't, he has the legal power to convene a summary court martial and let the board of officers make the decision.

Now here's an interesting point in favor of our system of investigating all there is to know about the man, trying to determine the reason for his getting off base, and figuring out the best way to handle him as an individual. If it is necessary for us to run the man up to the battalion commander either because we feel he is guilty or because we can't decide one way or the other, all of this prior preparation will stand us in good stead with the "old man." Obviously he's going to want to know all of this dope in order to do his job properly and we're the birds he's going to expect to furnish it. Any battalion commander worthy of the name is interested in the long range objective of making a good marine out of the offender rather than merely applying the old "eye for an eye" doctrine. Many times he will find the reason we were looking for in step number two while he is talking to the man. As far as that goes, so may we although the "old man," from experience, will know better what to look for. For example, a man might be up for stealing another man's shirt. In talking to the man, it may come out that his NCO has laid down the rule that he doesn't care how they do it but none of his men had better stand an inspection and be short any clothing and equipment. Of course, the man in this case is guilty of stealing. However, you damn well know what you can do to keep any more of your men from becoming theives.

Now maybe some of you clowns are wondering why ol' Base Plate is so worked up about this subject. Well, if you'd been read off as many times as I have by not only the old man but also the exec, "Old Granite Puss," you would make damn sure that you ran your company office hours the way they are supposed to be run. USMC



He may be told to report to his NCO for "special instruction." This, of course, is not punishment.

Competitive Promotions

By LtCol Charles L Banks and MSgt L. J. Donahue

THE MARINE CORPS HAS ALWAYS BEEN PROUD OF ITS noncommissioned officers. In all grades, during peace and war, the high caliber of these men has been a salient factor in the success of the Corps. It actually amounts to a selection of the best men. Therefore, a practical promotion system is a prime requisite in the procurement of high type noncommissioned officers.

A sound promotion system would select the best men available by making the requirements as high as feasible: it would provide uniformity in the interpretion of the promotion requirements by the commanding officer. However, the problems in the establishment of such a system have increased greatly since the beginning of World War II due to the increase in size of the Marine Corps and the assignment of all enlisted personnel to military occupational groups.

A promotion system has been set up with the following broad objectives:

"1. To provide the Marine Corps with appropriate numbers of noncommissioned officers in the various pay grades and with proper qualifications needed to fill the billets authorized.

2. To afford equal promotional opportunities for all enlisted personnel."

In addition certain sound basic requirements for promotion have been specified. A summarization of the requirements are as follows:

1. Specified minimum time in grade.

2. Qualification to fill a billet authorized in next higher grade in present specification serial number.

3. Recommendation for promotion by commanding officer who will certify that the individual is qualified for such promotion *in all respects.*

The present system as now in operation for the promotion of men to the first three pay grades is considered satisfactory; due to the greater number of billets in the fourth and fifth pay grades a similiar system would not be practical or workable.

The actual interpretation of the last two of the above requirements depends to a large extent on the unit's commanding officer, and the means he has at hand to determine the qualifications of the particular individual in his functional field.

The following charts illustrate the wide variation in interpretation of these last two promotion requirements. They are a breakdown of the actual monthly strength report, part three, of three units for the month of January, 1948.

CHART I

UNIT:	COL 1. No of PFCs Aboard	2 No Qualified for Promotion	3 Per cent Qualified
UNIT #1*	90	9	13%
UNIT #2	102	93	84%
UNIT #3	96	15	15%

CHART II

UNIT:	No of CPLs Aboard	No Qualified for Promotion	Per cent Qualified
UNIT #1*	78	10	13%
UNIT #2	20	14	70%
UNIT #3	43	9	20%

Naturally not all men on board would necessarily be qualified for promotion as to minimum time in grade, but the average number of men meeting this requirement would be about the same; the average length of service in all three units is roughly equal. None of these units has a high percentage of men direct from recruit training.

The variation, then, in the commanding officers' interpretation is clearly established. Entirely different methods were undoubtedly used by each commanding officer to satisfy himself as to the second and third promotion qualification of each individual. Due to this lack of uniformity the second broad objective of the system: i.e., "to afford equal promotional opportunities for all enlisted personnel," has not been carried out, in many cases, in promotion to the fourth and fifth pay grades.

In order to establish this uniformity in the interpretation of the requirements for promotion to the fourth and fifth pay grades a modification of the present system would seem to be indicated.

The second requirement for promotion, qualification to fill a billet in the next higher pay grade in specification serial number, could probably best be accomplished by an approved examination distributed by a central headquarters. Examinations would be prepared for each specification serial number of the fourth and fifth grades, the actual preparation being accomplished by officers familiar with the requirements of the billet for each specific specification serial number.

The unit would request the examinations prior to each promotion period; the request would be based on the number of men in each specification serial number eligible for promotion in the fifth and sixth pay grades. Examinations would be handled as classified material

*Only men with excellent records and two years service are assigned to this unit.

and given in a method similar to that now employed for the competitive examinations for appointment to the Naval Academy. A passing mark on the examination would be required to meet successfully the second requirement for promotion.

A STANDARD METHOD would provide a certain amount of uniformity in the interpretation of the third requirement. The actual accomplishment would be by the commanding officer in small units, and by a promotion board of officers in larger units, final approval resting with the commanding officer.

In addition to the knowledge and technical skill required for promotion, certain other factors should be taken into consideration in each individual case; the ability to pass successfully an examination would not insure the selection of the best men for promotion if the following were not also carefully considered:

Leadership and military bearing
Length of service
Marksmanship qualification
Conduct during current enlistment
Decorations and awards

The most important of these are the leadership and military bearing the man has demonstrated while a member of the unit, for one of the greatest derelictions of our present noncommissioned officer is his failure to assume the responsibilities of his grade. The demonstration of willingness to assume this responsibility is as important for a corporal as for a master sergeant.

To insure his competence to hold a warrant in the next higher grade, a man considered for promotion should have demonstrated the following to his commanding officer:

Proper military bearing and neatness.
Ability to drill and instruct troops commensurate with his grade.
Willingness to assume the responsibility of his grade.

After these factors, plus all the others that go into the judging of a man's leadership and military bearing, have been taken into consideration the commanding officer or promotion board would give the man a rating. The rating standard would be similar to that prescribed for noncommissioned officers' fitness report, and would employ the following scale; outstanding, excellent, very good, good, fair, unsatisfactory.

Length of service has always been given a proportionate importance in promotion, and rightfully so.

Also, the Marine Corps has traditionally stressed marksmanship training and qualifications to good advantage. Qualification of the weapon in which the man is armed should be taken into consideration.

It is certainly desirable that a man strive for a clean conduct record with his eye on promotion rather than fear of punishment.

Finally, personal decorations and awards should be added into the score, placing the importance on them that they deserve.

The above points have been included in the following chart: (The specific assignments of points is for illustration only, the goal being uniformity for all units.)

1. LEADERSHIP AND MILITARY BEARING:
   RATING: Outstanding —30 points
   Excellent —20 points
   Very good —10 points
   Good —No points
   Fair and Unsatisfactory —Disqualification for promotion.

2. LENGTH OF SERVICE:
   Each month of service —1 point

3. MARKSMANSHIP QUALIFICATION:
   Expert —5 points
   Sharpshooter —3 points
   Marksman —0 points
   Unqualified —Minus 5 points.

4. CONDUCT DURING CURRENT ENLISTMENT:
   Each Courts-martial —Minus 10 points
   Each Office Hours —Minus 3 points

5. DECORATIONS AND AWARDS:

Congressional Medal of Honor	—25 points
Navy Cross	—20 points
Silver Star, Distinquished Flying Cross, and Legion of Merit	—15 points
Bronze Star & Air Medal	—10 points
Letter of Commendation	— 5 points

The commanding officer, with the man's total score before him, would then form his opinion of the man's qualification for the third requirement. If the man is considered to have qualified for promotion by his commanding officer he is placed on the promotion roster for the specification serial number of the next higher grade. His numerical place on the roster is determined by the points he has on the above chart plus his examination grade.

If the man was transferred prior to his promotion, he would take the place on the promotion roster at his new station and in accordance with the date he was examined and his total number of points. In this way a transfer would not jeopardize the man's chances of promotion; and his new commanding officer would know that his qualification was ascertained by a standard method.

It is considered that such a system would not only give uniformity in the interpretation of promotion requirements, but would obtain the best men for promotion to the fourth and fifth pay grades throughout the Marine Corps. US MC



Marines in the Pacific War

Chapter 24

SUGAR LOAF AND SHURI: HARD POUNDING

By Fletcher Pratt

THERE SEEMS TO HAVE BEEN SOME QUESTION AT TOP command levels about this time as to whether it would not be better merely to run supply ships in for quick unloading and take them out again to avoid the Kamikazes which, if they were not whittling our fleet down as rapidly or as seriously as they hoped, were clearly beating up ships at a pace which the Navy could not support for long. One answer to this was that much of the damage was taking place on the picket line, without which there would be no radar warning for the forces ashore against attacks on their rear areas. Another, and the really operative objection, was that the demands of the Army on the ground were too nearly insatiable to be met by any program of touch-and-run supply, and somebody had to protect those cargo carriers moving in. By the third day of the invasion Yontan field could take emergency landings, but it was a long way from this to the point where a self-sustaining air organization could be built up on the island, with shops, spare parts, dispersion areas for planes, and the planes themselves.

The first planes to reach the island were the fighters of Marine Air Group 31, 94 day fighters and 15 night fighters, who came in on 7 April, and began to fly patrols at once. On the 9th, Marine Air Group 33 arrived with 96 more fighters. It was some weeks before Army fighters began to come in in numbers, and before there was any space to service their planes. This sounds like a lot of planes, but under the conditions of Okinawa, where air combat was almost continous, with interludes of all-out battle, it meant that as many as 12 planes a day would be lost, either through mechanical action, accident, or mere deterioration. These would have to be replaced at once, and with every replacement, every repair job, shop work would become necessary. Normally the two Marine Air Groups together would be able to get about 66 operational fighters into the air for combat on short notice; and after every battle there would be a new replacement problem.

Air power, so very mobile tactically, is strategically one of the least mobile of forces unless it is based aboard a carrier. Even bringing in these limited aviation installations was a long and slow process while the Tenth Army was involved in a major campaign against what its officers called "big Cassino" to indicate that the one in Italy had been only a comparatively minor affair. By 8 April the 7th and 96th Divisions were up against what they knew as the Machinato Line, running east and west across the island from north of Machinato to the shore north of the town of Tomai, but which we now know was the only outer glacis of the great fortress whose citadel was Shuri. On 9 April the 27th, some of whose units had been conquering the out-islands to the east of Okinawa, began to move into line on the right, west flank of the main island, with the 96th in the center of the 7th on the other wing.

The three divisions kept up steady pressure and by 15 April were ready to attack abreast except for one thing—not enough artillery ammunition, the final commentary on the necessity of keeping ships flowing into the landings, supplies moving across the beaches. Tenth Army, in fact, saw its problem as primarily one of artillery. On the front of the 96th, they were finding it necessary to register individual guns on located machine gun positions and fire enough rounds to get a direct hit. But when the infantry went forward they still found all the guns in the flanks of the hills alive and working and they were vigorously counterattacked from Gen Cho's lateral exists. There was later a 400 yard hill on this division's front, known as "the Conical;" two regiments would take two weeks to get past it. Gen R. O. Gard of the divisional artillery thought 24 hours of preparation fire would be too little against such a position, a figure like those from the trench-warfare front of western Europe, 1916.

It was 19 April before the ammunition situation

Part XXII: Artillery ammunition was very short and individual guns had to be registered on located machine gun positions. When the infantry moved forward they still found the guns in the flanks of the hill alive and working vigorously

cleared up enough for the attack to be launched with artillery support not only from the XXIV Corps guns and those of Tenth Army, but all of these III Amphib Corps and the borrowed cannon of the 1st Marine Division. By this date the third great Kamikaze attack had taken place and Adm Nimitz had come out in person, a good deal worried over the way his fleet was being cut down. He, and not a few others, would seem to have urged on Gen Buckner the desirability of another landing far enough south to get behind that ominous Shuri system. The 2d Marine Division was available, all the 77th Army Division soon would be, and in a pinch the 1st Marine Division could be used. Buckner said no; he had already examined the possibility in that direction and had made his decision. There were practicable beaches from Machinato down to Naha, but they were commanded by the hills west of Shuri, where the Japs had abundant artillery of every sort. Gen Bruce of the 77th had early suggested a landing on the southeastern beaches, but Tenth Army found it could supply food, but no ammunition, for such a move. True, that 2d Marine Division was available, but the best estimates showed that the beaches at the southeastern tip would only handle a single division, there would be the same old problem of supplying it, the distance was too great for it to have any fire support from Corps Artillery north of Shuri, and (final argument) it would be facing all the Japanese 24th Division and most of the 44th Independent Mixed Brigade, since to date only their 62d had been identified in the fighting. No; the extra landing was not practical.

THE ATTACK WENT FORWARD on the 19th then, the general plan being a double envelopment by the advance of the 7th and 27th on opposite flanks, while the 96th (which had come to the battle 1,000 men under strength and already had 2,731 casualties) exerted lighter pressure in the center. There were 27 battalions of artillery in support, in addition to the Navy ships off shore and a heavy preliminary bombardment, flown from the carriers; and the attack failed.

An abrupt ridge runs nearly across the island at this point, Kakazu. The left of the 27th and most of the 96th succeeded in gaining its crest, but it would take five days to clear it and the 7th Division could advance only 200 yards without having its flank fired into from this ridge. West of the ridge there was a fairly broad avenue of approach. Here a battalion of tanks led in the right wing of the 27th. Now Gen Ushijima had issued, among other orders, one for concentration against tanks —"The enemy's power lies in its tanks. It has become obvious that a general battle against the American forces is a battle against their tanks." The Jap commanders at the front called down artillery fire on the infantry supporting the 27th's tanks and the foot was stopped cold. The crews of the tanks not hit abandoned their vehicles and ran. Ushijima, in close touch with the situation, promptly overruled his own rules to order a counterattack in so favorable a situation and every one of the tanks was captured and blown up, nearly 60 of them.

Later in the day the divisional infantry, under urgings from above, picked itself up and followed the retiring Japs into the town of Machinato, which looked good on the map but which really meant little, as this was ground undefended except by fire from the rear.

ON THE 21ST, with everything at a standstill except the handwork on Kakazu, Tenth Army sent down an order to the III Amphib Corps to make available the tank battalion of the 1st Marine Division and the Japs began violently shelling our forward areas by night as a matter of practice. The order brought a protest from the Marines. The tank battalions in their organizations, they said, were not formations attached for a particular operation, but integral parts of the division, accustomed to working closely with a particular body of infantry, with whom they had developed those mutual understandings which so often render formal orders needless. To take these tankers away from the 1st would reduce the efficiency of both vehicles and infantry. In any case the need was not for tank crews, of whom the 27th still had plenty, but for tanks; could not the requirements be met from the Corps reserve of spares and by salvage operations?

Gen Buckner agreed and the advance ground slowly forward—500, 400, 200 yards a day— into the outer Jap positions till 28 April when the 27th had flowed over most of Machinato airfield, Kakazu Ridge was all ours, and the 7th Division had taken one of the most difficult cliff positions in the entire campaign. It had become quite clear several days before that any hope of a quick victory was gone; this would have to be an erosion attack. XXIV Corps now thought a landing in the rear of the Japs was possible and suggested using the two Marine Divisions for the purpose, but Gen Buckner's staff still saw logistic difficulties in such an expedition. Moreover the General wanted to get that 27th Division out of there and furnish relief for the 96th. Neither change could be accomplished if the Marines were used separately.

His plan was for a double envelopment of Shuri; on the 24th he had warned III Corps to make the 1st Marine Division available and had assembled Bruce's 77th in the rear areas. On the 28th the 1st Marine Division took over from the 27th and the 77th replaced the 96th, the relieved formations leaving their artillery in position. By this date XXIV Corps estimated the Jap dead as 15,865; there were 57 prisoners. Our casualties for the month, including those in the Navy and in the air, which



1st Division Marines attempting to negotiate the Wana-Northern Shuri position had no cover and had to stand up and run across naked ground into a level stream of bullets near Sugar Loaf Hill.

the Japanese figures do not, were 36,614. Units of the Japanese 24th Division had been identified in line, opposite our 7th.

It was thus a new campaign, and in more than one sense for although there had been a continual dribble of Kamikaze attacks, there were no more large efforts until Adm Ugaski poured his suiciders down in an assault on a new system on the night of 27 April, continuing till the morning of the 29th. He could only assemble 65 Kamikaze and 50 Tokobetseu. A cargo carrier was sunk; the transport *Pinckney*, the destroyers *Haggard* and *Hazelwood* and the APD *Rathbone* on the picket line received homeport damage from Kamikaze, as did the destroyers *Daly* and *Twiggs* with the fleet, while the destroyer *Ralph Talbot* was badly bombed and *Hutchins* holed by a suicide boat. Six destroyers—*Bennion*, *Brown*, *Butler*, *Hickox*, *Shannon*, *Wadsworth*— and a destroyer escort—*England*—had lesser hurts; but what chiefly excited indignation in American ranks was that a Kamikaze crashed into the side of the white-painted, brightly-lighted hospital ship *Comfort* lying out at sea. This was all bad enough, but it now seemed evident that the conscientious work done in the air and on the Kyushu fields was beginning to bear fruit, for the whole attack did not count much over 200 planes, of which a number were patched-up old trainers, and there was a noticeable decline in the quality of Jap piloting. The fleet shot down 118 in this bout; planes from the Okinawa fields got 35 more and antiaircraft batteries around the fields another five. For the month of April the fleet had 1,298 Japanese planes to its credit.

*On the 16th *New York* took a Kamikaze aboard; on the 22nd the destroyer *Hudson* had been badly hurt by a bomb and *Isherwood* by a Kamikaze; the same day the minesweep *Swallow* was sunk.

III

THE 1ST MARINE DIVISION was now under MajGen Pedro A. Del Valle, the artilleryman whose guns saved Guadalcanal. He was a Puerto Rican, who had been through Annapolis and worked his way up to this command on sheer furious drive; had been with the Italian Marshall Badoglio as an observer during the conquest of Ethiopia; was active, excitable, very quick of mind. His regimental commanders were Col Kenneth B. Chappell for the 1st, which took over the right of his line close to the shore, Col John H. Griebel, whose 5th Regiment moved in next to the 77th, and Col Edward W. Snedeker of the 7th, in reserve. The objective was the Asa Kawa, a stream which slants northwestward between bluffs from the nub of the island around Tametamo's Castle.

In its original position the division was well forward on the right along the southeast-facing slope of the low ridge that holds Machinato airfield, just short of the village of Nakanishi, which lies in a valley between the airfield and the next upthrust of the ground. The attack opened at 0930 on 2 May, the heaviest effort on the extreme right to get around that next ridge and work eastward up the north bank of the Asa. As soon as the turning point was reached heavy fire came down onto the flank from the south bank of the Asa and onto its front from Shuri Ridge. 200 or 300 yards was all that could be made this day. Next morning both regiments attacked again, with the 3d Armored Amphtrac Battalion lying offshore to give fire support for the 1st Regiment's right. There was some gain here and the 5th in the center made all of 500 yards, but the left wing of the 1st was held up in a heavy street fight for Nakanishi village. The veterans of the 1st were finding it the same kind of work as against Bloody Nose on Peleliu, with extra Japanese refinements, the chief of which was the enemy employment of artillery. Americans had never seen the Japanese use it on so large a scale or so effectively. They still avoided concentrating fires in our fashion, but their guns shot all the time and they had the ground thoroughly registered. They combed over all possible lines of approach and the rest areas where troops in reserve were waiting, so that the men in these positions took almost as many casualties from shells as those at the fighting front from mortars and small arms.

That night, 3 May, the Japanese bombardment rose in a crescendo and spread all along the line till XXIV Corps estimated the enemy had fired not less than 7,600 rounds. At the same time a night air battle broke out toward the north; planes began to drop bombs near Yontan field and ships vaguely outlined by star shell began to move along the water, as our destroyers went into a perfect passion of firing. It was, in fact, a major counterattack, the first, last, and only one launched on Okinawa; ordered from and supported by Tokyo. The Empire's part was a big drive of Special Attack units, this time exclusively against the offshore shipping.

THE AIR PART had 75 Navy and 59 Army suiciders in it; there were almost as many fighters and bombers. On the picket line no less than six Kamikaze crashed *Aaron Ward*; it was a miracle she was not sunk. The destroyers *Little, Luce* and *Morrison* were sunk, with three LSMs. More Kamikazes badly damaged the cruiser *Birmingham* and the destroyers *Ingraham, Nacomb and Shea;* the escort carrier *Sangamon* was so much hurt she was found not worth repairing when they towed her home. Lesser damage was done to the minesweep *Gayety*, the destroyers *Bache, Gwin, Hopkins* and *Lowry* and to the seaplane tender *St. George.* A suicide boat got one cargo carrier and for this the Japs paid with 98 planes shot down by our carrier patrols and 50 over the island.


Ushijima's part in the operation was ingeniously organized; it was intended to retake Katena airfield and all the areas up to it. He had brought a good part of his undamaged 24th Division into line and launched it with tanks down the slopes against the right flank of our 7th Army Division, while nearly a battalion attempted a counterlanding in that division's rear. Along that eastern side of the island the barges were discovered early and cut to pieces by our ships. Only 20 men reached shore and these were shot down in a hurry, while the 7th beat off the inland attack with losses that amounted to about a third of the Japanese 22d Regiment.

On the 1st Division's flank some 500 Japs did get ashore in another counterlanding at the village Kuwan, just behind the 1st Regiment's front line. But these attackers had no luck at all, for they had reached ground just at the edge of the area where the 3d Armored Amphtracs were bivouaced. The infantry companies at the beach formed line along the first high ground and held. The armored amphibs came in and pinned the Japs down with fire; Del Valle sent a battalion from the 7th Marines to help and by noon the 500 were wiped out. A smaller band reached shore well back, near the division CP, but the ordinary security detachment took care of them, capturing several, who proved to be armed with demolition charges and instructions to blow up command and communications centers, but above all, tanks.

THE MORNING OF 4 MAY Army had reached the decision to swing the 1st Division southeastward against the ground that was dominating the coastal flats and to insert the 6th Division on the right for a swing across the Asa Kawa, beyond which the island widens westward. The attack of that day was delayed only one hour by the hullabaloo during the night and did pretty well on the left flank, gaining the north bank of the Asa Kawa for a distance of some 1,000 yards. In the center both the 5th Marines and 77th Division were up against a system of ridges of Dakeshi town, the Army men astride the main keel of the island. The going was slow against extensively organized positions; the 1st Division could not take the ridges by up-and-over assault, but must pivot around each and work up the valleys between, against fire from both flanks and ahead.

Ushijima renewed his counterattack on the night of 4th, striking hard both against the joint where the 77th met the 1st Marine Division, and that where it bordered the 7th Army Division. The attacks were broken off with losses so heavy that it now seemed even to Gen Buckner and his staff that the enemy were in a state of exhaustion that would permit a landing on the south coast.

It was, of course, impossible for another reason; that



all our available troops had been committed. III Amphib Corps was assuming control of the west end of the line, with the 6th Division moving on 6 May.

All that day and the next were consumed in arranging the right flank while the 1st Marine Division and the 77th ground away slowly along the approaches to Dakeshi. It rained so hard on 8 May that tanks could not be used and the 1st did not actually take Dakeshi town till the 12th, when it was a little ahead of the 77th, which was having trouble with the most difficult terrain of all. By this date the 96th had replaced the 7th Division and was making good gains east of Shuri. The 1st Marine Division lines were now somewhat in the form of an L, and with tunnel exits along flat and riser, this seemed to Ushijima favorable opportunity for counter-attacks. He launched a whole series of them, in strength from a platoon to a company; got some of his ground back and inflicted fairly heavy casualties in exchange for we do not know how many of his own. Now the 7th Regiment had to attack leftward against the high ground flanking any further advance by the division, while the 77th worked along the main ridge of the island and the 96th attacked its Conical Hill west of Yonabaru airfield.

The advance in the center was working into the main Shuri defenses and gains were measured in yards a day. The supply situation was bad in all units for lack of roads and the continual Jap artillery fire along possible routes. The terrain in the center was impassible to tanks; nothing could solve the problem of counterattacks from the tunnels but hand to hand fighting. By 17 May the 1st and 77th were at the foot of opposite sides of the ridge that rises to Shuri; but on the 20th, the 96th had taken Conical and was able to support the 77th with some fire from the flanks. A new scheme of maneuver was set up.

This was partly the result of the gains by the 96th, partly that of the work of the 6th Marine Division, which had been fighting its own private war along the western shore. When Gen Shepherd's troops went into line on 8 May it was already evident that Ushijima's positions consisted essentially of a series of spokes radiating both down and outward from the hub at Shuri. This was the reason Gen Buckner had adopted the double envelopment plan; any attempt to pierce the center would have come under converging fire from the spokes, impossible to bear. But it must always be remembered with regard to the spokelopping operations of the 6th and 96th, that they were under distant observation from high ground at the center of the web as well as from the spoke directly in front of them at the moment. This observation was accompanied by accurate and persistent mortar and artillery fire which bore with special weight on the areas normally considered "safe"—command posts, communications centers, supply echelons. In addition the 6th had Machinato airfield in its immediate rear, with good beaches; it was always necessary to provide guards



Marines of a demolition squad of the 6th Division watch a cave entrance on Okinawa for Japs after a phosphorous grenade has been thrown in. A Jap soldier was flushed out and killed.

against a renewed counterlanding.

These were the conditions under which the 6th prepared to cross the Asa Kawa on 10 May. The river and its drainage system form a bowl with one bite out of the lip at the sea. The stream itself was too deep for fording and patrols found the bottom too soft for heavy vehicles. Col Merlin M. Schneider's 22d Regiment (the division had yet so narrow a front that only one regiment could operate) had the job of forcing the passage. The engineers set up a footbridge during the early night; the plan was to pass two battalions across it, send one to ford the upper part of the stream, seize the high ground on the south side of the bowl and set up a bridge that would bear heavy traffic. The movement started at 0330. Two companies only had passed the footbridge when a Jap suicide squad blew it and themselves up, but one of the bridge battalions took a detour to the fordable upper part of the stream and by daybreak six companies were in line and launching an attack on the southern hills.

THEY DID NOT GET FAR. There was an elevation on the sea face and from this, as well as from the high ground ahead and inland, artillery fire of all calibres increased steadily with the light. By noon the advance was only 150 yards; by twilight 350. There was a lack of fire from close supporting weapons, as tanks. During the night, with shells dropping all around them, the engineers got up a Bailey bridge. It was finished by 1000 of 11 May, the tanks poured across and after a hard fight with the help of a cruiser in the offing the ridges around the Asa bowl were won.

That day out on the ocean the Kamikazes came back. All night snoopers had been around both our fleet and the British down off the Sakishimas. With dawn the attack came screaming in, 70 Kamikaze and 80 Tokobetsu against our ships, about as many against His Majesty's. Of the latter the carriers *Victorious* and *Formidable* were hit; their own hard decks bore the shock well but plane operations were kept down to almost nothing. In our fleet two Kamikazes hit Mitscher's flagship *Bunker Hill;* she was a dreadful wreck, with over 400 killed. The destroyers *Evans, H. W. Hadley,* an LCS and the battleship *New Mexico* (again—unlucky ship!) were also much damaged, but at the anchorages only one cargo carrier was hurt and she not badly. The carrier air patrols and those from Yontan worked well together that day, the former knocking down 72 planes, the latter 19 before any considerable number of suiciders could get in. LtGen Sugawara, of the Army Special Attack units, complained bitterly that the efficiency of his planes was much reduced because he could not get gasoline for



1st Division Marines were subjected to fire from rifle slits concealed in walls of cliffs and guns registered on points of concealment along their line of advance in southern part of island.

them; the railroads were being constantly bombed by the Americans. Adm Ugeki, he said, must see to it at once that the American carriers were driven from the region.

The 22d Regiment was now on high ground in the center with its right still held by the ridge near the sea and its left by a long upslope. It went forward on 12 May, slowly, for even the high flat ground was all eroded into little draws that held tombs which were exits from tunnels. At 2000 that evening Gen Shepherd had decided to put in a battalion of the 29th on the left flank and make the main advance there. From the battalion commander a note arrived, saying that he had encountered a big hill caved and tunnelled, where three tanks had been lost.

III

THE HILL HAD NO NAME at that time, but it would have a grim one not long later; for the 6th Division was up against the Sugar Loaf, main western anchorage of Shuri line, where there took place a combat not exceeded for closeness and desperation by that at the Conical or Shuri Castle itself or Iwo Jima or any other. The Japs had fed the 44th Independent Mixed in to help what was left of the 62d Division in this area. They were fresh troops, and in this part of the brigade, unlike the elements encountered in the north, there were few or no Okinawan conscripts. Sugar Loaf itself was only the outer bastion of a general position which denied our forces not only access to the rear of Shuri, but also to the river Asato and the harbor and city of Naha; hence its careful organization.

About 300 yards long, it rose abruptly from the slightly tilted plain which lay completely open. 200 yards south and slightly east of Sugar Loaf was another hill, the Horseshoe, with its convex side toward Sugar Loaf, and east of both a third, much larger, and slightly higher eminence called the Half Moon, which is not really a half moon at all in traces, but more like a capital H with the left leg bent. All three had received the personal attention of Gen Cho and were more elaborately tunnelled than most hills on Okinawa. It will be clear from any consideration of the supporting Horseshoe and Half Moon hills that their convolutions included reverse slopes from which mortars could bear on the Sugar Loaf without themselves being subject to any fear of attack till Sugar Loaf itself were taken and our infantry could deal with them by grenade. Beyond Half Moon the ground rose rapidly leftward to Shuri in the 1st Division's zone.

Against this Sugar Loaf position the 22d Regiment was launched on the afternoon of 14 May, with tanks working around both flanks of the hill in support and one company each against the lower flanking eminences. The armor ran into heavy 47mm fire from Horseshoe and the Half Moon; part of it was disabled, the rest driven

off. Three times one company reached the Sugar Loaf crest; three times they were beaten back by mortar fire from the supporting hills which the flanking companies could not approach. After dark Maj Henry A. Courtney, Jr., a battalion exec, detected signs of an imminent counterattack that would have been extremely hard to handle. He rallied the 20 remaining men of the company with 25 others from a supply echelon, rushed the summit once more, instructing his men to throw grenades as rapidly as possible and dig in under cover of the explosions. They made it and held the crest all night; the Jap counter was completely broken up by their close-range grenading. Courtney was killed (they gave him a posthumous Medal of Honor), in the morning one officer and 19 exhausted men, all that were left of them, had to be withdrawn.

Col Schneider of the regiment nevertheless planned to drive home again next morning against Sugar Loaf, while Gen Shepherd of the division would take some pressure off him by putting in the 29th against the Half Moon on the extreme left of the divisional area. The 1st Division beyond was still held up by the broad, but high-rising gulch called Wana Draw, its sides fortified and overlooked by the guns of Shuri Castle.

The force of the Sugar Loaf position was now pretty well understood on our side, and the preliminary artillery fire for the 0800 attack, though scheduled for only 15 minutes duration, had not only the 6th Division's own guns in it, but also those of the Army 249th Artillery and some big pieces belonging to corps, emplaced farther back. This fire produced an unexpected dividend. Gen Ushijima, or Suzuki of the 44th Independent Mixed, had thought when the remnant of the Courtney command was driven down Sugar Loaf, that it was another break like that of the 27th Division on 19 April and a strong local counterattack was ordered. The American artillery preparation caught these counterattackers just emerging from their holes, pinned them down, killed a good many, and took all the verve of the movement.

WITH JAPANESE PERSISTENCE the 44th Independent Mixed tried their attack anyway as soon as the fire let up, heaviest in the center against the exhausted 2d Battalion, 22d, but also spreading along the line to include part of the area where the 29th was working forward slowly under intense fire. The Japanese had withdrawn from some of the forward hill faces on that front to let their flanking guns fire in enfilade from the ridges of the 1st Division had not yet suceeded in gaining. Attack and counterattack swayed back and forth till noon and later; by that time the 22d had lost a couple of hundred yards, the 29th had gained maybe 700 and on both sides the men in the offensives were fought out. As soon as it grew dark enough to force our observation planes back to the fields, the Japs as usual opened up with all the guns and mortars they had, under which fire 2/22 was relieved by 3/22. More companies of the 29th were moved in, and preparations were made for a general assault by the two regiments against the Sugar Loaf-Half Moon complex, in which Sugar Loaf was to be attacked simultaneously from front and both flanks.

That day, 16 May, was the toughest of the whole campaign, the attack failed and under appalling casualties. The encirclement from the west was stopped by the fire from Horseshoe where there were still antitank guns in force. At the center the crest of Sugar Loaf was reached and on the left the outer peaks of Half Moon, but from these points not an inch of progress could be made. Gen Suzuki had moved nearly all remaining of the 44th Independent Mixed into the firing positions and from them, mortar shells fell continuously into the hilltop fox holes, while every minute down into the twilight, the guns of Shuri poured more shells from the left rear. By night all the advance elements had to be withdrawn with no real gain reported for the day.

WHAT WAS NOW TO BE DONE? Renew the attack; this time with the 29th carrying the ball in an effort to win the Half Moon and flank out the heaviest of the firing positions supporting Sugar Loaf, while the exhausted 22d held its lines. *Colorado*, *Mississippi* and *New York* were moved in to fire support from their big guns; the carriers flew strikes with 1,000-pound bombs against Half Moon, and under cover of support fires closer than they had been since Iwo Jima, the regiment worked forward into the northern bowl of Half Moon and scaled the precipitous crest. The men were getting a lot of fire from Shuri behind them and more from the Horseshoe; and as soon as they were on the upper slope of Half Moon they were violently counterattacked from the lateral galleries and thrown off. They attacked again; were again counterattacked; and it was not until the fourth attack in the twilight that the Japs would let them stay.

By this time the ammunition of the spearheading company was exhausted and it had so many wounded that there were not enough whole men left to get them to the rear. The crest had to be abandoned; our men now held only that northern bowl of the Half Moon. But the Japanese positions had been in fact fatally shaken, for that bowl and its adjacent caves were the most effective of the firing positions from which Sugar Loaf had been supported, and in Sugar Loaf itself the defending force was so cut down by casualties that the commander there doubted whether it could stand another day's fighting.

In this desperate case Gen Suzuki assembled what reserves he had behind Horseshoe and Half Moon and as soon as dusk removed our observation planes, boldly launched them across the open to the rescue of Sugar Loaf. The inching advances had now given our forces enough points to permit ground observation, the Japs



1st Division marines engaged in a series of individualistic bush-whacking encounters between units as small as a single fire team and Japanese who behaved in quite as independent manner.

were detected forming and the fire of no less than 12 battalions of artillery came down directly on them in the early dark. This concentration blew the reinforcement attempt all to bits; it is doubtful whether more than a dozen men reached their destination. When the 29th attacked again on 18 May, tanks leading around both sides of Sugar Loaf, they broke through, the long contested hill was taken. It had cost the 6th Division, 2,662 killed and wounded; the number of shells fired by the divisional artillery was 92,560.

THE HEIGHT on which Shuri stands thrusts a long curved finger out to the northwest, on the north slope of which lay that Dakeshi Town for which the 1st Division had fought so hard. South of it stands another ridge, whose southern face bore the town of Wana with Wana Draw below it; and the ridge beyond, culminating eastward in Shuri itself, is that on whose outer tentacles the Sugar Loaf positions had been organized. It may be called Shuri Ridge. While the 6th had been engaged in its climactic struggle for Sugar Loaf, the 1st Division was attempting to negotiate this Wana-Northern Shuri position, with the 7th Regiment in line on the left, the 1st on the right. The battle was only less desperate than that of the 6th Division because the surrounding conditions did not permit it to have the same character. On the front before Sugar Loaf there was no cover; no matter how heavy the supporting fire, a moment arrived when men had to stand up and run across naked ground into a level stream of bullets. Where the 1st Division was fighting there was all too much cover except in Wana Draw itself. It was never quite possible to tell whether a given little depression in the almost-vertical rock wall was a good spot to take defilade from fire or the outer slant of one of Gen Cho's rifle slits, or merely a spot on which a gun above or to one side had been registered. The concerted rushes and stands against counterattack that marked the action of the 6th did not happen here. The whole battle was a series of individualistic bush-whacking encounters between units as small as a single fire team and Japanese who behaved in quite as independent a manner.

Technically the attack of the 7th Regiment was directed

at first against the north face and crest of Wana Ridge. The 1st Regiment was trying to work eastward up Wana Draw to gain the north face of Shuri Ridge. Actually, both regimental commands operated chiefly as administrative organizations, which could do little more than assign a general direction of attack to their subordinate units. On 15 May the 5th Regiment passed through the 1st and took up the work against Wana Draw. Here tanks could be and were used, but slowly, every hundred feet of ground had to be combed over, the cave entrances sought and sealed—and all the while, fire came down from above.

In this type of fighting the western edges of Wana Draw were won by 17 May and the 7th Regiment gained the crest of the ridge above. Their presence there was one of the reasons why the 6th Division's assault out southwestward carried Sugar Loaf the next day; the defenders of Shuri had too much to do in their own front yard to think about helping units on their flanks, even with fire. On 18 May the whole line heaved forward again, the 7th capturing a regimental command post. On the 19th the Japs counterattacked the 7th all day long from their lateral tunnels, taking heavy casualties in the process, and that night the 1st Regiment went back into line to relieve the 7th. On 20 and 21 May the division cleared up Wana Ridge, gained the little town that was the northern outpost of Shuri and came up against a narrow neck of high ridge. Beyond Shuri Castle itself looked down. That day the division tried to work formations across Wana Draw onto Shuri Ridge, failed to do so and was preparing for another try the following morning.

ON THE EAST SIDE of the island the 7th Division had just broken through along the shore at Yonabaru; it was getting heavy resistance from the hills to the south of the breakthrough line, but only put out security detachments in that direction, wheeling the main force of its drive rightward, with the 96th Division on its own right, up against the main Shuri mass on that side. The design was to pinch out the 77th, which had been long in line, done much hard fighting and needed relief; but that night it began to rain.

It is an open question whether Okinawa, Eritrea in Africa, or some place in the Belgian Congo has the highest humidity in the world over a year's run, but there is no doubt that the island of Ryukyus can put on a spectacular rainfall performance over a brief space—as much as nine inches a day. The rainy season had now arrived; and all the other rains seen by Americans on Okinawa, though heavy enough, were reduced to the status of Scotch mist. In the ordinary fields mud became ankle deep; on the alleged roads it was up to the knees and even amphtracs had difficulty. Fires could not be kept up for coffee or hot food. On the eastern flank of the island, where supply lines for the Army troops had to run back across the made tracks through the vertical ridges, it became next to impossible to keep up with the ordinary logistic requirements for a static situation, say nothing of handling the vast quantities of extra food, ammunition and evacuations demanded by an all-out attack.

Only the front line of the 6th Division, which had the most direct supply lines, was there much action during the week of rains that supervened. During the night of 18-19 May Suzuki made repeated counterattacks in an effort to regain his Sugar Loaf. Next morning Gen Shepherd moved in the 4th Regiment, his last reserve, to the relief of the 29th. The main weight of the attack was against the western flank. It early won the western eminence of Horseshoe and the Marines could look down into the mortar positions that had beaten at them for so long.

THIS MEANT the jig was about up for the anchor position on the left flank of the Shuri line and no one was better aware of it than Gen Mitsuru Ushijima, for those protected fire positions on Horseshoe were the soul of his defense. If they were knocked out, our forces could get down into the Kokuba River valley, follow that corridor eastward to the rear of the Shuri positions, perhaps hook up with the 7th Division and surround the bulk of the Japs in their castle. The General issued preparatory orders for the evacuation of the Shuri position, but in the meanwhile called on the naval guard force covering the big Naha airfield on Oroku Peninsula for a battalion to be used in a suicide attack. RearAdm Ota, in command of the naval guards, did not take at all kindly to this idea, and went so far as to radio protest to Tokyo, but Ushijima outranked him and there was nothing to be done about it.

The battalion marched then, and was launched in attack at 2130, small groups at first, building up to the crescendo of a full scale assault under mortar cover. It was a true Banzai, and like most of them, accomplished exactly nothing; in the morning there were nearly 500 bodies on the ground before the 4th and the Japanese resistance was broken. All the next day was spent in reducing the tunnels of the Horseshoe and by twilight that ridge was ours. Over on the left flank of the attack the Half Moon still held out, nor could even the fresh regiment reach its crests because of the fire from Shuri falling onto our men's rear. That day, 21 May, Gen Shepherd made the command decision to set up a defensive flank on the outer, western slopes of Half Moon, swing his weight rightward, cross the Asato and clear out Naha City, for whose northern flank the river formed a moat.

The next day was spent in closing up to the stream; on that night, under the first heavy rain, patrols pushed across. They found surprisingly little resistance among



A Marine patrol on the outskirts of Naha, capital of Okinawa, pushes its way past the bombed out burial tombs. The Japanese made good use of many of these burial vaults as gun positions.

houses reduced to debris, and this gave Gen Shepherd the idea that the place might be taken without the help of the tanks, which were in any case now too much mired down to be used.

By noon the 4th was wading the stream in the little groups of an infiltration attack. Within the city there were only snipers, but just east of the place is a ridge running north and south, separating the town from what an Okinawan would consider the elegant suburb of Machishi and this ridge was tunnelled in the usual fashion. A good deal of fire issued from it, and most of the 4th was gradually drawn into a contest that was not terminated in their favor till 25 May, for although the enemy were now too weak in manpower to use the elaborate positions with the greatest effect, general Mud stood their aid. In the meanwhile the 29th Regiment was brought into Naha and gradually cleared it out. By 29 May the town had fallen, the division was in line facing southeastward and pushing up the peninsula between the Asato and Kokuba.

On that same day both the 1st Division and XXIV Corps had planned to renew their assault on Shuri. For the last two or three days there had been indications that the Japs were abandoning their castle under cover of poor flying weather and our inability to move tanks in rapid pursuit. Little groups of them appeared on the roads and were taken under fire; the shooting of their own guns showed a diminuendo. 29 May broke bright and clear for a wonder and at 0730 the 5th Marines jumped off in attack through mud only beginning to congeal. Now during all those days of rain the 1st Division had been patrolling energetically, mainly in a southerly direction, and every patrol had taken fire from its left and rear, the eminence on which Tametomo's castle stood. The castle was in the 77th Division's zone, but the 1st Battalion, 5th and the Reconnaissance Company pivoted round toward the castle from a direction almost due south to get rid of that pestiferous fire. The head of the Reconnaissance Company got into a tunnel; its security detachment had just set up a machine gun above, when down trail came marching 60 Japs who all fell down in three neat rows when the gun opened fire. They were the last organized group in Shuri; the 1st Battalion burst in and the long fight was won. The men of the 77th, whose attack was planned for later in the day, were more than a little annoyed.

to be concluded

In Brief

To speed up *transitional jet pilot training*, the Air Force recently announced the development of a two-place version of the Lockheed jet fighter P-80. The new fighter will be known as the TF-80C, the Air Force revealed, and is essentially the same in appearance as its famous counterpart, the "Shooting Star," except that its length has been increased by three feet. A seven-foot cockpit canopy and a larger air conditioning and refrigeration system were installed.

An *air warning network* of the kind which might have prevented the Pearl Harbor disaster is now being pushed jointly with the related problems of expanding civil and military air navigation facilities. Recent inquiry in the armed forces revealed that the continental limits of the United States are little better protected against a sneak attack than they were on 7 December 1941.

The United States Air Force is planning a *detachable fuselage aircraft* to work on the trailer-truck principle. The Fairchild Engine and Aircraft Corporation has announced a contract to build the C-120 pack-plane. The air tractor will fly with or without its pack or fuselage. The detachable fuselage will hasten ground handling of equipment.

An innovation in *setting up communications* was displayed in an exercise staged by the 9th Air Force at Fort Benning, Ga., recently. A low flying C-47 flew over a target area and laid approximately 3,000 feet of telephone wire. Within a few minutes communications technicians, landed earlier by parachute and glider, had a telephone conversation taking place over the wire reeled out by the plane.

The Navy has named some of the *submarines to be converted* into special cargo and troop carriers. The *Barbero* will be the Navy's first undersea cargo carrier. The *Sea Lion* will be converted for transport use and the *Tigrone* will be a radar picket submarine. All three were built in 1944 and are in the 1,525 ton class.

To augment jet training while awaiting delivery of jet-propelled fighters for use on carriers, the Navy will procure 50 Lockheed P-80 Shooting Stars through the Air Force. The fighters are scheduled for delivery before the summer is over. The P-80s will be used to familiarize Naval pilots and ground crews with Jet fighters. Tactical and gunnery problems will be studied in navigational flights.

The Air Force said recently it would *train 3,800 air reserve officer* training corps students from colleges at nine air bases during June and July. The trainees will receive six weeks of full time summer camp training. They have completed the first three years of air ROTC.

An essay contest is being sponsored by the *Naval Institute Proceedings* for enlisted personnel of the Navy, Marine Corps and Coast Guard with a prize of not less than $300 and not more than $700, a gold medal and life membership in the Institute being offered the winning contestant. Essays must be on a subject pertaining to the Naval profession and should not exceed 8,000 words. Manuscripts must reach the Secretary-Treasurer, *Naval Institute Proceedings*, Annapolis, Md., on or before 1 Aug 1948.

An *automatic focus rectifier* for mosaic map making, the first ever to be produced in America, was delivered recently to the Army Corps of Engineers by Bausch & Lomb Optical Company. Resembling an ordinary photo enlarger, it simultaneously enlarges, prints, and automatically reduces aerial photographs to a common scale and level, correcting the tilt encountered as a result of the plane's variation angle and level at the time photographs are taken.

The Navy announced its plans for a *helicopter fleet* "second to none in the world." The vertically rising rotary-wing aircraft will be used for rescue, transport of cargo and men, and for observation missions. They also have great potentialities for refueling guided missile launchers at sea and in anti-submarine work.

The Air Force has announced that it is rushing the development of a *new jet engine* expected to give longer range and more power than present types. The engine is the XJ-37, designed at the Lockheed Aircraft Corporation. Designed to develop 5,000 pounds of thrust, the engine equals 5,000 horsepower when moving at 375mph. The Air Force intends to use the new engine in the North American P-86. The expected low fuel consumption of the new engine will permit longer ranges than do present jet engines.

The Naval Officers Placement Service, located in suite 427, 1129 Vermont Ave., N.W., Washington, D.C. was established for the purpose of placing men and women who served as commissioned officers in the Naval service (including Marine Corps and Coast Guard) in positions commensurate with their qualifications. This unique organization is more than a mere clearing house for jobs since it offers counsel on the latest and most accepted placement technique. To date, one-third of the personnel registered have been placed.

A hydrostatic pressure tank, large enough to hold a one-man Japanese submarine, is on the way to Silver Springs, Md., for subsequent transfer to the Naval Ordnance Laboratory at White Oak, Md., to test pressure on underwater missiles of various types. The tank weighs 105 tons, exclusive of the door, which weighs 40 tons.

Spurred by the specter of a national oil shortage, *Navy researchers are looking for new fuels* to power their diesels. Synthetics made from coal or natural gas seems the best bet. On the docket is a cold room that will create temperatures as low as 85 below zero, so that diesels and fuels may be developed for sub-zero operation.

The Army has announced that henceforth *new recruits will be taught* about citizenship and venereal disease control instead of booby traps, riggings and common hand tools. The course in venereal disease control will be independent of the regular course in sanitation and will emphasize self-control, clean living and its rewards and the responsibilities of the soldier to home, family, church and nation.

The *Industrial College of the Armed Forces* will move part of its faculty to the Chicago Museum of Science and Industry early this summer for a unique two-week's course. This school is designed for men who will probably hold key positions in industry within the next decade. The problems of industrial and economic mobilization will constitute the main courses. Among the 18 subjects of the curriculum will be economic intelligence, geopolitics and planning for industrial mobilization, the impact of new weapons on war and the organization of government for national security.

A camera that will take pictures automatically as fast as the photographer can trip the shutter is under development in the Signal Corps Engineering Laboratories at Fort Monmouth, N. J. A range finder will focus the camera as the photographer sights on his picture, and the film will be moved automatically to the next exposure. There are three lenses for taking pictures at various distances. As the film moves, the shutter will be cocked, ready to take another picture as fast as the photographer can trip it again.

The *Navy Unit Commendation* has been awarded to Marine and Army Air units which comprised the South Pacific Combat Air Transport Command, commonly known SCAT, during the Guadalcanal, Bougainville, and Admiralties phases of World War II. Marine Aircraft Group 25, Headquarters Squadron 25, Service Squadron 25, and Marine Transport Squadrons 152, 153, and 253 were the Marine units awarded the commendation. Army units cited were the 403d Troop Carrier Group and the 801st Evacuation Hospital of the 13th Troop Carrier Squadron.

The Navy recently revealed its new *transonic Skyrocket* with rocket power at El Segundo, Calif. The new plane, described as a winged V-2, is designed to approach the speed of sound, (approximately 760 mph at sea level). It is a research craft to gather information relative to problems encountered at those speeds. Powered by a Westinghouse turbojet engine and with a rocket engine built by Reaction Motors, Inc., the new plane has a needle-nose, slimly tapered fuselage and stubby swept-back wings.

Naval Aviation's Air Combat Record

ON THE OCCASION OF THE 37TH ANNIVERSARY OF Naval Aviation on May 8, the Navy released details of its combat record against the Japanese air forces during Wold War II.

The accompanying tables present the record of U. S. Navy and Fleet Marine Force aircraft against the Japanese air forces during World War II. The total of 15,401 Japanese planes destroyed includes only those shot down, or destroyed while parked at their home bases, by gunfire, rocket fire or bombs from U. S. Navy and Fleet Marine Force aircraft. It does not include Japanese planes destroyed by Navy antiaircraft or by suicide crashes.

Similarly, the 897 losses of U. S. Navy and Fleet Marine Force planes include only those lost as a result of air-to-air combat with Japanese planes, and not those lost to Japanese antiaircraft fire. Thus, the data reflect solely of the struggle for control of the air and for air supremacy between United States naval aviation on the one hand, and the Japanese Army and Navy air forces on the other.

ATTENTION IS INVITED to the following significant data in the tables:

(1) U. S. carrier aircraft accounted for 12,268, or 80 per cent of all Japanese planes destroyed by U. S. Navy and Fleet Marine Force aircraft.

(2) Of the 12,268 Japanese planes destroyed by U. S. carrier aircraft, 6,444, or 52 per cent, were shot down in air combat; 5,649, or 47 per cent, were destroyed on the ground at Japanese land bases; and 175, or 1 per cent, were destroyed on Japanese carriers.

(3) Of the 12,268 Japanese planes destroyed by U. S. carrier aircraft, 11,368, or 93 per cent, were Japanese land-based planes, and only 900, or 7 per cent, were based on Japanese carriers.

(4) Of the 12,268 Japanese planes destroyed by U. S. carrier aircraft, 8,812, or 72 per cent, were destroyed in the Japanese inner zone (Japan, Ryukus, Formosa, Philippines), and only 2,541, or 21 per cent, among the isolated island groups of the Central Pacific. The remaining 7 per cent were destroyed in the Solomons, New Guinea, East Indies, China and Indo China.

(5) U. S. carrier aircraft destroyed 4,571 Japanese planes in the five months of the Philippines campaign, and 4,387 in the final campaigns against Okinawa and Japan; 4,539, or more than half of the total for these campaigns, were destroyed on the ground at Japanese inner zone air fields.

(6) In the Philippines, Okinawa and Japan campaigns, U. S. carrier aircraft lost 217 planes in aerial combat while shooting down 4,419 Japanese planes, almost all land-based, or one air combat loss for every 20 Japanese planes shot down.

(7) For the war as a whole, U. S. carrier fighters shot down 18.4 Japanese planes for each fighter shot down by Japanese planes. U. S. Navy and Fleet Marine Force land-based fighters of the same types shot down 7.3 Japanese planes for each of their own air combat losses.

(8) During 1944 and 1945, air combat losses of Navy and Fleet Marine Force single-engine dive and torpedo bombers were 38 out of 103,793 bombing sorties, or one plane lost to enemy interceptors per 2,731 sorties. Navy and Fleet Marine Force bombers had fighter escort to nearly every target.

(9) Of 9,249 Japanese planes shot down by U. S. Navy and Fleet Marine Force aircraft, 5,962, or 65 per cent, were single-engine fighters, and 30 per cent were bombers; 3,896 were fighters of the Zero type.

(10) The Solomons air campaign accounted for 1,983 out of 3,133, or 63 per cent of the total Japanese planes destroyed by land-based Fleet Marine and Navy aircraft, but for only 537 out of 12,268, or 4 per cent of the total destruction by U. S. Carrier planes.

(11) Wholesale destruction of Japanese planes by U. S. Navy and Fleet Marine Force aircraft began at the end of the Solomons-air campaign, when the newly expanded carrier force commenced the Central Pacific campaign. Only 7 per cent of the total Japanese planes destroyed by U. S. Navy and Fleet Marine Force aircraft were accounted for in 1942, only 9 per cent in 1943, while 12,909, or 84 per cent (11,268 by carrier forces alone) were destroyed in 1944 and 1945.

(12) During the one month of October, 1944, 1,851 Japanese planes were destroyed by U. S. carrier air-

Notes On Sources

DATA on Japanese airplanes destroyed in air combat are based on reports by U. S. Navy and Fleet Marine Force pilots, as assessed by Air Combat Intelligence officers and commanding officers after thorough interrogation. It is recognized that these reports, even after assessment, are subject to some possibility of over-estimation. It has proved impossible, however, to obtain from the Japanese any complete and reliable data on their losses in air combat. For this reason these reports (which were compiled according to the same definitions and standards used by the Army Air Forces and Allied Air Forces) represent the only available method of determining the total and comparative effectiveness of the various air forces in air combat with Japanese aircraft. Aircraft reported as "probably destroyed" are not included in these data.

Data on Japanese aircraft destroyed on the ground by U. S. Navy and Fleet Marine Force aircraft are in most cases based on photographic evidence, conservatively interpreted by specially trained officers, and not on pilot reports. In instances where it has been possible, after capture of Japanese bases or from enemy records, to compare the data with the actual destruction inflicted, the conservatism has been confirmed. Evidence that a grounded plane is damaged beyond repair is not always visible in an aerial photo, and many planes which had actually been rendered unflyable were thus omitted from the count of planes destroyed. It has not been possible to determine which models of Navy planes should be credited with destruction of parked Japanese planes, since most destruction resulted from multiple strafing, rocket and bombing attack by carrier fighters and bombers.

Data on own losses in air combat include not only planes known to have been shot down by Japanese planes, but also aircraft which returned to base and were later scrapped because of damage sustained from the guns of enemy planes. They also include all missing aircraft whose cause of loss was not known but was presumed to have been aerial combat.

All data herein are from tabulations prepared under the supervision of Air Combat Intelligence Officers in the Office of Naval Intelligence.

craft in the Philippines, Formosa, and Ryukyus.

(13) In January and February, 1945, U. S. carrier aircraft struck targets over a 3,000-mile arc from Tokyo through Iwo Jima, Okinawa, Formosa, Luzon and Hong Kong to Indo China, shooting down 675 Japanese land-based planes (including 420 over Japan) and destroying 712 at their bases.

(14) Fleet Marine Force aircraft carrier-based and land-based, accounted for 2,238, or 24 per cent, of the Japanese planes shot down in air combat by all elements of naval aviation.

(15) U. S. Navy long-range Liberator and Privateer patrol planes, which usually operated singly or in pairs on unescorted 800-to-1,000 mile search missions, shot down 304 Japanese planes. Their air combat losses numbered 23, or one per 13 Japanese planes shot down.

(16) Higher loss rates for naval aircraft in 1942 and 1943 resulted largely from shortages of fighters, bases and carriers. Only in November, 1943, did sufficient carriers become available to permit concentration of more than 300 fighters at any point. From then on, mobile concentrations of 400 to 1,000 carrier fighters were standard.

The tables follow:

U. S. NAVY AND MARINE CORPS BOMBERS AND PATROL PLANES LOST IN AIR COMBAT WITH JAPANESE AIRCRAFT DURING WORLD WAR II, BY YEARS

Type of Plane	1941-42	1943	1944	1945	Total
Carrier-Based Dive Bombers	39	4	16	2	61
Carrier-Based Torpedo Bombers	32	8	7	5	52
Land-Based Dive & Torpedo Bombers	27	22	5	3	57
Patrol Planes	30	9	16	9	64
TOTAL	128	43	44	19	234
Dive & Torpedo Bomber Action Sorties	2,950	13,730	56,970	46,823	120,473
Bomber Action Sorties Per Air Combat Loss	30	404	2,035	4,682	709

AIR COMBAT RECORD OF U. S. NAVY AND MARINE CORPS FIGHTER PLANES AGAINST JAPANESE AIRCRAFT DURING WORLD II, BY YEARS

Type of U. S. Navy and Marine Corps Planes	Year	Japanese Aircraft Shot Down by Own Fighters	Own Fighters Lost in Air Combat	Japanese Aircraft Shot Down Per Own Fighter Loss
Carrier-Based Fighters				
	1942	255	42	6.1
	1943	266	22	12.1
	1944	3,212	161	20.0
	1945	2,484	113	22.0
	Total	6,217	338	18.4
Land-Based Fighters				
	1941-2	440	93	4.7
	1943	880	163	5.4
	1944	557	55	10.1
	1945	507	14	36.2*
	Total	2,384	325	7.3
Carrier and Land-Based Fighters		8,601	663	13.0

*This record made largely against Japanese suicide planes, manned by inferior pilots, at Okinawa.

JAPANESE AIRCRAFT SHOT DOWN IN AIR COMBAT WORLD WAR II, BY SERVICE AND MODEL OF U. S. PLANE CREDITED WITH DESTRUCTION

Plane Model	Carrier-Based		Land-Based		Totals
	Navy	Marine Corps	Navy	Marine Corps	
Fighters					
F6F Hellcat	4,947	0	115	93	5,155
F4U,FG Corsair	360	218	160	1,402	2,140
F4F Wildcat (1942-43)	270	*	147	456	873
FM Wildcat (1944-45)	422	*	*	*	422
Dive and Torpedo Bombers					
SBD Dauntless	106	*	10	22	138
SB2C,SBW Helldiver	43	*	0	0	43
TBF,TBM Avenger	72	0	7	19	98
Patrol Planes					
PB4Y Liberator, Privateer	*	*	304	0	304
PV Ventura	*	*	9	11	20
PBM Mariner	*	*	16	*	16
Other Fighter Bomber Patrol	6	*	17	17	40
Totals	6,226	218	785	2,020	9,249

*Not operated in combat.
†Special night-fighter model.

JAPANESE AIRCRAFT DESTROYED BY U. S. NAVY AND MARINE CORPS PLANES, AND OWN LOSSES IN AIR COMBAT WITH JAPANESE PLANES, DURING WORLD WAR II, BY LOCATION

Area (including adjacent sea areas)	Japanese Planes Destroyed By U. S. Navy and Marine Corps Carrier-Bases Planes		Japanese Planes Destroyed By U. S. Navy and Marine Corps Land-Based Planes		Total Japanese Planes Destroyed	Total U. S. Navy and Marine Corps Planes Lost in Air Combat	
	In Air Combat	On Ground or Carrier	In Air Combat	On Ground or Carrier		Carrier-Based	Land-Based
Japan	954	1,816	54	7	2,831	85	7
Ryukyus	1,361	491	510	18	2,380	25	14
Formosa	457	521	20	6	1,004	26	0
Philippines	1,622	1,590	99	112	3,423	77	18
Iwo Jima, Bonins	232	167	22	9	430	22	1
Marianas	741	217	10	2	970	45	0
Carolines	270	266	48	21	605	15	0
Marshalls, Gilberts	170	187	24	6	387	12	4
Wake, Marcus, Midway	115	176	33	5	329	43	33
Solomons, Bismarcks	446	91	1,882	101	2,520	97	341
New Guinea, East Indies	37	202	31	18	288	0	9
China, Korea, Indo China	39	100	67	22	228	4	3
Aleutians, Kuriles	0	0	5	1	6	0	16
TOTALS	6,444	5,824	2,805	328	15,401	451	446

JAPANESE AIRCRAFT DESTROYED BY U. S. NAVY AND MARINE CORPS PLANES, AND OWN LOSSES IN AIR COMBAT WITH JAPANESE PLANES, IN PRINCIPAL CARRIER OPERATIONS OF WORLD WAR II

Operation	Dates of Carrier Action	Japanese Aircraft Destroyed by U. S. Carrier Planes		U. S. Carrier
		In Air Combat	On Ground or Carrier	Aircraft Lost in Air Combat
1942				
Coral Sea Battle	May 4-8	66	21	21
Battle of Midway	June 4-6	69	140	41
Guadalcanal Campaign*	Aug 7-Nov 15	185	51	42
1943				
Bougainville and Rabaul	Nov 1-11	138	19	22
Gilbert Islands Campaign	Nov 19-Dec 8	96	56	7
1944				
Marshall Islands Campaign†	Jan 30-Feb. 23	189	260	7
First Palau Raid	March 30-April 1	111	46	3
Hollandia Landings	April 21-26	30	103	0
Second Turk Raid	April 30-May 1	60	85	5
Marianas Campaign‡	June 11-August 8	917	306	65
Philippines Campaign, Total	Sept 9-Jan 30	2,186	2,385	109
September Raids	Sept 9-24	372	521	12
Ryukyus-Formosa Raids	Oct 10-16	438	366	25
Leyte Landings§	Oct 11-30	750	296	49
Support of Leyte Defense	Nov 5-25	272	498	11
Mindoro Landing	Dec 13-17	111	230	2
Lingayen Landings	Jan 3-30 ('45)	209	374	6
China Sea Raids	Jan 12-16 ('45)	34	100	4
1945				
First Toyko Raids	Feb. 16-25	420	228	38
Okinawa Campaign‖	March 18-June 22	1,692	824	59
Final Attacks on Japan	July 10-August 15	121	1,102	11

*Includes Guadalcanal Landing of August 7-8, Battle of Eastern Solomons of August 24, Battle of Santa Cruz of October 26, Battle of Guadalcanal of November 12-15, and minor actions.
†Includes First Truk Raid of February 16-17, and Marianas Raid of February 23.
‡Includes four attacks on Iwo Jima, one on Palau, and Battle of Phillippine Sea.
§Includes Battle for Leyte Gulf.
‖Includes all attacks on Japan during this period.
Action by U. S. Navy and Marine Corps land-based planes during the same operations is excluded from all figures.

JAPANESE AIRCRAFT DESTROYED BY U. S. NAVY AND MARINE CORPS PLANES AND OWN LOSSES IN AIR COMBAT WITH JAPANESE PLANES, DURING WORLD WAR II, BY QUARTERS

Year and Quarter		Japanese Planes Destroyed By U. S. Navy and Marine Corps Carrier-Bases Planes		Japanese Planes Destroyed By U. S. Navy and Marine Corps Land-Based Planes		Total Japanese Planes Destroyed	Total U. S. Navy and Marine Corps Planes Lost in Air Combat	
		In Air Combat	On Ground or Carrier	In Air Combat	On Ground or Carrier		Carrier-Based	Land-Based
1942	1st*	34	12	15	0	61	7	16
	2d	135	161	21	0	317	62	39
	3d	88	30	167	1	286	23	26
	4th	97	21	273	7	398	21	71
1943	1st	15	0	76	6	97	2	35
	2d	0	0	187	0	187	0	53
	3d	5	22	403	33	463	2	72
	4th	278	102	273	30	683	30	34
1944	1st	325	299	539	27	1,190	14	57
	2d	894	451	53	8	1,406	53	2
	3d	502	661	17	20	1,200	30	4
	4th	1,572	1,390	119	72	3,153	87	11
1945	1st	1,024	1,081	68	71	2,244	82	3
	2d	1,348	492	555	30	2,425	27	19
	July-Aug	127	1,102	39	23	1,291	11	4
By Year	1942*	354	224	476	8	1,062	113	152
	1943	298	124	939	69	1,430	34	194
	1944	3,293	2,801	728	127	6,949	184	74
	1945	2,499	2,675	662	124	5,960	120	26
GRAND TOTAL		6,444#	5,824@	2,805	328	15,401	451	446
PEAK MONTHS:	June 1944	797	215	21	0	1,033	48	0
	October 1944	1,189	662	19	37	1,907	74	3
	April 1945	1,049	304	156	15	1,524	18	5

*Includes December 1941 # Includes about 725 Japanese carrier planes @ Includes about 175 Japanese planes aboard carriers.

TO THE EDITOR

Message Center

Traditions . . .

DEAR SIR:

Who is LtCol John Corbin? He is not listed in the Register.

He who writes so convincingly and so accurately appears to lack the courage of his convictions. Whose toes does he step on that he must remain incognito?

The GAZETTE's policy of sniping from behind the protection of anonymity has long been deplored. Isn't it about time that your authors tell us who they are? I think you owe your readers an explanation.

JAMES H. N. HUDNALL,
Colonel, USMC.

Ed: "John Corbin' is LtCol Robert D. Heinl, Jr. When the first of his "Traditions" articles was submitted we already had another of his articles scheduled for the same issue. Rather than have two articles in the same issue appear under the same by-line, we asked LtCol Heinl to supply a pseudonym. For the sake of continuity, we ran the second article on traditions over the same pen name.

GAZETTE policy does not permit sniping from the cover of anonymity. Pseudonyms are used rarely and then only to cover up the rather embarrassing fact that but six or seven Marine officers seem willing to contribute regularly to the professional magazine of the Corps. Maybe the others don't need the three cents per word.

DEAR SIR:

I have read with a great deal of interest the article contributed by LtCol "John Corbin" in the April issue on the subject of the *Thin Line of Tradition—II*. While I agree with him to a great extent on what he *has said*, it is my opinion that the most important aspect of tradition he has either omitted unknowingly or intentionally. I prefer to assume the latter.

Mr Webster gives two meanings to the word tradition; the first is in line with the article: "Something handed down from the past; an inherited culture, attitude, etc." It is in this line that the writer of the article attacks the problem and bemoans the fact that, like the Irishman, "We never were the man we once were." The second meaning of the word is the one which I feel the writer has neglected and is the one that should be given the more consideration. It is: "the oral transmission of information, beliefs, customs, etc., from ancestors to posterity without written memorials; also a belief, practise, etc., so transmitted."

Upon reading the article I was interested in one who would take the trouble to set his thoughts down in such a fashion. I repaired to the bible of service genealogy only to discover that, in the edition I had, no such a person appeared. So, fortunately, what I am about to say can and must take on the nature of a generality, rather than to be specific and directed to one person.

The senior lieutenant colonel in the Marine Corps is of the Class of 1930, the junior about 1938. Splitting the difference we can assign the "average" lieutenant colonel to the Class of 1934. Such an officer would have had the benefit of a full year at the Basic School, and from 1935 to 1939, four years of "indoctrination" in peace time procedures. He would have served his three years as a second lieutenant, two as a first, and, with the advent of the emergency and the war, rapidly advanced to his present rank, in which he has served now some five or six years. He skipped through the ranks of captain and major so rapidly that he probably wouldn't even look up if someone addressed him as "Major."

During the peace time years he would have served under officers long in each grade, steeped in the traditions of the service, and each carrying in his heart a determination to make those traditions survive. Came the war and our lieutenant colonel overnight became the one responsible for carrying on the traditions. What did most of us do? His reactions were probably typical. He was young, well-educated, had some opinions about this and that, and would show some of the old fuds a thing or two now that he had the chance. The fact that we muffed the ball is evident in the need for someone to write an article about the *Thin Line of Tradition—II*.

That states the problem. What is the solution? Go back to Mr Webster again and to his second meaning. "The oral transmission of information. . . ." Do you remember, as I do, some of the Simon pure SOBs that we had for commanding officers? Do you remember how, every chance they got, they gave you some bit of advice, instruction, or a word of caution? Do you remember, as I do, how you stood stiff as a ramrod, heart thumping, knees castaneting, before the Old Man at Office Hours and tried to explain why the Corporal of the Guard had not awakened you in time to call the Old Man's orderly in time to have his coffee ready when he wanted it? When you get to the point where you consider that that type of commanding officer is no more, be careful, you may be one yourself! But if you are, and more of us should be, the *Thin Line of Tradition* will be a Tartar Wall. In short, you must

safeguard the traditions of the Corps jealously, completely and with eternal vigilance or it will be necessary for you, in another year or so, to again write about the *Thin Line of Tradition—III.*"

J. H. Berry
Colonel, USMC.

Dear Sir:

LtCol John Corbin, in a recent article *The Thin Line of Tradition—II* laments the passing of certain fine old customs. For the demise of certain of these I can join him with a tear or two. As regards his comment on "prisoners" I am dry-eyed.

"To be effective, punishment must be dramatized" is a quote he lifts from a Wermacht manual, and one in which he apparently concurs. It is to be noted that dramatization of punishment was good theater when the ancestors of the Wermacht manual writers were known as Goths and Visigoths. The rack, the roadside gibbet, flogging through the fleet, keel-hauling, quartering and other forms of dramatization were tried and abandoned as civilization advanced. However, the German flair for brutality retained "drama"; as exemplified by their stigmatization of the Jews, by their Dachaus, by reprisal killings of innocent civilians. Our culture rejects this source or continuation of "tradition."

Regrettably, while the "dramatization of punishment" has been eschewed by the people of the civilized world, there are amongst us some Neanderthal types who ignore the advances of culture and morality. The "Litchfield" trials were proof of this. The records of naval courts are not lacking in evidence of other devotees of the "drama."

The official proscription of confinement *for* punishment, the recognition of the dignity of man (even one confined) may mean the end of a tradition. If it does, it is well done.

J. Maginnis
Captain, USN.

Dear Sir:

Once again the fulminations of LtCol Corbin have interested me, and I am beginning to believe that he and I could sing hymns together. In your April issue he lets fly with a few of the best on the subject of uniforms.

From his remarks and his general attitude, one might think that he had been standing at my elbow one day in Washington. It was a Saturday afternoon, the first really good day we had had in weeks, and I was walking down F Street near 12th. Starlings were busy doing their curious chores, everyone on the sidewalks was in a complacent mood, and the drivers were striking an absolutely minimum number of pedestrians. Even the cops were happy and polite.

The only sour note that was struck, as far as I was concerned, was that of a Marine corporal in blues, escorting a very personable young woman. Now only the shade of O'Bannon knows where the lad had his boot camp training, but I don't hesitate to say that he had had little of it and had forgotten most of what he was told. His cap, which had an artificial fore and aft tilt, was perched on the back of his unclipped neck. His blouse was open down the first three top buttons, and his belt hung wide and free and unbuckled. He was a disgrace to his outfit, and the sight of him was enough to ruin the good impression made by the average youngster in greens that was in town on the same day.

Again, I received a report from one of my undercover agents from the West Coast just the other day. This young man, who served in the Sixth in the early days of the war, recently returned to active duty for a few weeks.

"Dear Pop," the letter began, for as such was I known to the respectful young in the good old days of iron discipline and bologna sandwiches on Saturday noon, "I was at the ————" (the name of the base will be supplied to anyone of the rank of colonel or above who evinces an honest desire to do anything constructive about it) "two weeks ago—and honestly, the place is a disgrace. It looks like an Army quartermaster depot, the way people dress and act. What they need down there are some men like "Pogey-bait" Mike Bialek or Sergeants Shaw and Kennedy of Nicaragua fame who were in the Sixth, as you may recall. But alas, I think that breed is dying out, and all the snappy new blues in the world won't help."

Tempora mutantur, et nos mutamur in illos must have been written by a middleaged Roman, a somewhat disillusioned old boy who had decided that there wasn't much use trying to hold onto the shirt tail of the old man with the scythe so as to slow him down. I'm not so sure. Times change, certainly, and we do change with them. But we are under no compulsion to change blindly. We have the power of selection, the power to look out into the rapid current and grab hold of certain things as they drift by and save them for the value they have.

John L. Zimmerman
Captain, USMCR.

Dear Sir:

Regarding *The Thin Line of Tradition—II,* by LtCol John Corbin, appearing in the April issue of the Marine Corps Gazette, permit me to extend my most sincere congratulations for your treatment of a most opportune subject.

I feel that LtCol Corbin has hit upon a subject that a good many of us have, at one time or another, thought about but have failed to act upon. I felt that the article was addressed to me and every other officer and noncommissioned officer that considers service in the Marine Corps as something more than just a job.

It seems to me that too often we consider the niceties of the service to be something automatic among our enlisted people upon completion of boot camp, or inherent in our noncommissioned officers and junior officers. The people who have seen the traditions of the Corps in practice are the very ones to whom this article should be addressed. It is upon those who are aware of what is happening to our traditions that the

blame must fall. What have we done to encourage its use? Whose responsibility is it that the ship's bell hasn't been polished or that the field music was not instructed in its use? Who is responsible for the absence of the formal guard mount and the appearance of our command both on the station and ashore? Who is responsible for the everyday conduct of our command? We, the officers and noncommissioned officers are to bear the blame, especially those that have watched these traditions pass into the haziness of memory with only a wave of the hand but no attempt to recall them.

At the present, I am under instruction at a school on an Army post. Troops of this command consist primarily of the 3d Armored Division. These people are members of a branch of the Army long steeped in tradition—the cavalry. The Army is doing its best to instill the snap and soldierly conduct that was best to some degree during the war years. One of the prime difficulties they are experiencing here is in the reawakening of the all but lost traditions of the prewar Army. The problem is recognized by every officer and noncommissioned officer as being of the utmost importance in fostering the *esprit de corps* and high morale so prized by the Armored Cavalry.

The genuine interest and admiration that I have seen here toward the Marine Corps is indicative of the reputations that we must preserve. Direct statements and questions that I have received serve to accentuate LtCol Corbin's feelings on this matter. "How is it that you people achieve such loyalty and interest among your enlisted men?" is often asked. The close alliance between officer and enlisted men in the Marine Corps is a subject of much comment. These observations indicate to me that given identical material to work with, it is the customs and traditions of the Marine Corps that are largely responsible for the *esprit de corps* so highly prized within our units.

The preservation of custom and tradition is accomplished by 100 per cent usage every day of the year. It is the responsibility of each individual and can not be delegated. LtCol Corbin has placed the heavy hand of responsibility on each of us who has the privilege of calling himself a United States marine.

ROBERT E. BRANT
Captain, USMC.

Officer Education . . .

DEAR SIR:

As early as March 1945 we were told through the Navy of its great plans for educating its officers, especially those who came from the line and also those reserve officers who subsequently transferred to the Regular Marine Corps. A few scattered articles appeared in some of the various service magazines stressing the need for the aforementioned officers' schooling in order that they might be on equal footing with academy men.

Recently a Navy Department Bulletin (CL-160-47) came out with detailed plans for sending their officers to colleges over the United States. No mention was specifically made of Marine officers. True, many of our officers came from the line but why should we continue being treated like foster children of the Navy? Why was no provision made for these Marine officers who fell in the same category as their fellow Naval officers?

At a later date I was informed by Headquarters that this bulletin did not apply to Marine officers and as far as I can ascertain, no similar program has been instituted or proposed for Marine officers.

I feel sure there are many other officers of the Marine Corps who feel as I do and who want to pursue this type of education for the betterment of the service as well as the individual.

There were many Marine officers who were required to take a written examination upon transfer from the Reserve to the Regular Marine Corps because they did not have the required formal education. That obstacle has been overcome and these officers are relatively equal in footing with their fellow officers, but many courses of instruction have been offered to officers who have the prerequisite formal education, automatically eliminating the "uneducated."

I don't know the author of the proposals cited in the Circular Letter, but it is evident the Marine Corps was completely forgotten.

Sir, this is not to be construed to be a gripe and maybe this very same thing has come to the attention of higher echelon, but I feel that in your position you may be able to enlighten me on this subject as to what progress has been made, if any.

POUL F. PEDERSEN
1stLt., USMC.

Unloading at Iwo . . .

DEAR SIR:

Permit me to quote from 1stLt Robert B. Asprey's article *The Weasel and Assault Supply,* April 1948 issue: "The small amounts of the three essentials—ammunition, water and food —actually sent forward by the shore parties to the assault troops [on Iwo Jima] were carried mainly by the few available weasels of each Division."

In the 4th Marine Division there were among other items, 60,101 cubic feet or 1,603,020 lbs. of high priority assault supplies loaded in four LSTs assigned to the 10th Amphibian Tractor Battalion. By dark of D+1 (20 February 1945) the LVTs of the 10th Amphibian Tractor Battalion had unloaded and delivered these supplies to the assault forces on the beaches of Iwo Jima in the following quantities:

LST A	98 per cent unloaded.
LST B	100 per cent unloaded.
LST C	100 per cent unloaded.
LST D	75 per cent unloaded.

In addition a comparable record was established by the 5th Amphibian Tractor Battalion also operating with the 4th Marine Division. The figures quoted are from the Special

Action Report of the 10th Amphibian Tractor Battalion for the Iwo Jima Operation.

While the weasel is an excellent vehicle and undoubtedly proved useful in later stages of the operation for assault unit supply, the LVT still did the big job when the beaches were hot.

Due credit also should be given to the 3d and 11th Amphibian Tractor Battalions attached to the 5th Marine Division for their work in getting supplies in during the critical days. In reference to the using amphibian trailers with the maintenance LVTs of the proposed Weasel Company, I again quote from the 10th Amphibian Battalion Special Action Report for the Iwo Jima Operation:

"(a) [Amphibian] Trailers were difficult to manage in the surf and caused LVTs to broach.

"(b) Trailers pulled sterns of LVTs [LVT (2)] down in surf causing LVT engine to flood.

"(c) LVTs could barely move trailers in soft sand resulting in serious clutch wear and even damage.

"(d) When trailers sank they could not be cast free readily and caused LVTs to sink with them."

LVTS had to be empty in order to tow trailers ashore, thus a vehicle (LVT) capable of carrying up to 9,000 lbs. had to be empty in order to tow a trailer carrying only 4,500 lbs.

The less said about amphibian trailers the better. They are a good emergency source of spare truck tires and can be used to sprinkle roads with minor modifications. With the exception of the discordant notes sounded above I agree with the Lieutenant that a Weasel Company should prove of value.

V. J. Croizat
Major, USMC.

No School Tie . . .

Dear Sir:

A Marine Corps Academy is what the Marine Corps does *not* need. One of the greatest strengths of Marine officers as a group is the varied sources from which they entered the Corps and were commissioned. We have never had the problem of any serf-perpetuating hierarchy of alumni from one school. The old school tie throws no weight around the Marine Corps. Marine officers come from the Naval Academy, the enlisted ranks, and from the civilian colleges via the Platoon Leaders Class, NROTC, and Naval Aviation. What could be healthier, more representative, or more democratic?

Lt Reavis bemoans the fact that new Marine officers get only nine months of Basic School before being thrown to the mercy of the FMF and the troops. During the war many good men were turned into fine officers and went immediately into combat with less than nine months of officers school.

The many men of diversified backgrounds who are selected for the Basic School are there because they are considered to have the character, appearance, and attitudes which give promise of their *becoming* good Marine officers. Their background of school, family, or culture is not all-important. The Marine Corps does not expect the graduates of the Basic School to be experts in the many skills of the Corps.

At the Basic School new lieutenants are exposed to the accumulated wisdom of many hundreds of officers' experiences. The new officer will spend the rest of his career studying and digesting the material he gets at the Marine Corps Schools. In addition he will get on-the-job training beginning with his first duty station.

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New River Landing--1862

FEW MARINES SPLASHING THROUGH THE SURF to the white sands of Onslow Beach are acquainted with its curious amphibious precedents. A natural approach to Wilmington, the New River area was much in the attention of Federal blockading squadrons during the Civil War. Such was the case on 23 November 1862 when Lt William Barker Cushing, USN, in command of the *Ellis* took the town of Jacksonville, N. C. The *Ellis* was a small steamer of about 100 tons, captured from the Confederates. It had iron plating three-eighths inches thick, mounted a 100-pound Parrott gun in her bows and a 12-pound rifled howitzer aft. Cushing himself was often brillant, sometimes erratic, and always brave. Born in 1842, he bilged out of the Naval Academy in 1861, was appointed a warrant officer and at 19 was commissioned a full lieutenant. Best known for the torpedoing of the Confederate ram *Albemarle*, he was also the hero of at least a dozen nautical adventures, including the raid on Jacksonville. His own report of the affair follows:

"I entered the New River Inlet on the twenty-third of November with the United States steamer *Ellis*, succeeded in passing the narrow and shallow place called the Rocks and started up the river. My object was to sweep the river, capture any vessels there, capture the town of Jacksonville, or Onslow Court House, take the Wilmington mail, and destroy any salt works that I might find on the banks. I expected to surprise the enemy in going up and then to fight my way out. Five miles from the mouth I came in sight of a vessel bound outward with a load of cotton and turpentine. The enemy fired her to prevent her falling into our hands. I ran alongside, made sure that they could not extinguish the flames, and again steamed up the river. At 1 p.m. I reached the town of Jacksonville, landed, threw out my pickets and placed guards over the public buildings. This place is the county seat of Onslow County, and quite an important town. It is situated on the right bank of the river, going up, and is thirty-five or forty miles from the mouth. I captured twenty-five stand of public arms in the court house and postoffice, quite a large mail and two schooners. I also confiscated the negroes of the Confederate post master. I forgot to mention that the town is situated upon the main turnpike road from Wilmington. Several rebel officers escaped as I neared the town and carried the news to that city.

"At 2.30 p.m. I started down the river and at 5 p.m. came in sight of a camp on the bank, which I thoroughly shelled. At the point where the schooner, captured in the morning, was still burning the the enemy opened fire on the *Ellis* with rifles, but were soon silenced by our guns.

"I had two pilots on board, both of whom informed me that it would be impossible to take the steamer from the river that night.

"High water and daylight were two things absolutely essential in order to take her out. I, therefore, came to anchor about five miles from the outer bar, took my prizes alongside, and made every preparation to repel an attack. All night long the signal fires of the enemy could be seen upon the banks. At daylight I got underway and had nearly reached the worst place in the channel when the enemy opened on us two pieces of artillery. I placed the vessel in position, at once hoisted the battle flag at the fore, the crew gave it three cheers, and we went into action. In one hour we had driven the enemy from his guns and from the bluff and passed within a hundred yards of their position without receiving fire. Up to this time I had been in every way successful, but was here destined to meet with an accident that changed the fortunes of the day and resulted in the destruction of my vessel. About five hundred yards from the bluffs the pilots, mistaking the channel, ran the *Ellis* hard and fast aground.

"All hands went to work at once to lighten her and anchors and steam were used to get her afloat, but without success. The headway of the steamer had forced her over a shoal and into a position where, as the center of a circle, we had a circumference of shoal all around. When the tide fell I sent a party ashore to take possession of the artillery abandoned in the morning, but when they reached the field it was discovered that it had been removed while we were at work upon the vessel.

"If I had secured this I proposed to construct a shore battery to assist in the defense of my vessel

continued on page 34